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ABSTRACT 
It has been demonstrated that when a rotation of a visual 
pattern is implied, an observer's memory for the orientation 
of the pattern tends to be displaced forward in the direction 
of the irnpl ied movement (Freyd & Finke, 19 8 4) . This 
phenomenon has been termed - "represent at ion moment urn", in 
analogy to the way a physical object continues along its path 
of motion through inertia. 
In this current research, attempts were made to extend 
this phenomenon into the auditory domain, by using implied 
movement of sound rather than vision. The first two 
experiments adopted the standard procedure, employing three 
static speakers in the inducing stage, with a probe point on 
either side. The prediction was, that the probe speaker 
placed forward in the direction of movement would be more 
difficult to identify as being ''different", because subject's 
memory had been distorted towards that location. The results 
however did not support the hypothesis. 
The final two experiments were bas~d on the apparent 
motion procedure adopted by Hubbard & Bharucha (1988). 
Subjects were asked to listen to a sound progressing in a 
linear fashion behind a curtain in front of them. When the 
sound stopped they were asked to indicate the vanishing point. 
Results showed that subject's perception of the last location 
of the sound was displaced forward in the direction of the 
motion, in accord with Freyd's memory displacement hypothesis. 
Implications for further research in this area are also 





The importance of the detection of movement for human 
perception and cognition has been noted by many researchers. 
Gibson (1979); Johansson (1975); Cutting & Kozlowski (1977), 
and Lasher (1981) have all shown that the human perceptual 
system is particularly responsive to changes in the 
environment. Also, the claim that movement is fundamental to 
an understanding of the physical world is supported by 
demonstrations with infants which indicate a crucial role for 
relative movement in the parsing of the visual scene into 
coherent and bounded objects (Spelke, 1982; & Spelke, 1983) . 
These experiments noted that information about movement was 
more important for perceiving object cohesiveness than unity 
of shape, colour and texture. This has led to the claim that 
perhaps the perceptual system may be organized for analysing 
change rather than stasis, and to the extent that dynamic 
information is important to perception we may expect it also 
to be important to representation (Freyd, 1983a). 
2 
DEVELOPING A THEORY OF DYNAMIC REPRESENTATIONS 
Freyd' s interest in this area initially grew from 
questions she had about how people manage to recognize and 
interpret handwriting when so many styles, and degrees of 
legibility are encountered daily. The traditional pattern 
recognition accounts of letter perception i.e. Template 
Matching and Feature Analysis Theories - refer Anderson, 1990) 
did not seem to adequately account for this ability because 
they proposed that readers either recognized given letters by 
perceiving their "distinctive features", or else they 
attempted to compare them to various stored patterns. Instead, 
Freyd proposed that perhaps handwriting recognition makes use 
of our knowledge about how letters are formed, and that we use 
this knowledge of drawing method when interpreting static 
traces. Interestingly, this idea was born out of a personal 
awareness Freyd gained whilst learning to read and write 
Japanese characters. She discovered that if she wanted her 
characters to be easily recognized by native Japanese readers, 
then following the correct stroke order was of critical 
importance. An experimental study specifically aimed at 
investigating her hypothesis (Freyd, 1983a) indeed suggested 
that knowledge and familiarity with the drawing methods used, 
aided the recognition of static characters that were distorted 
in some way. This added credence to a previous study (Zimmer, 
1982) which had revealed that people were better able to 
answer questions about the visual characteristics of a given 
handwritten letter when they formed a mental image of the 
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letter being drawn rather than just an image of the static 
letter. 
These findings therefore indicated that the process of 
handwriting recognition can be influenced by tacit knowledge 
about how letters are formed; and that readers appear capable 
of using this prior knowledge to help them decipher written 
text, by forming a dynamic mental image of the letter being 
drawn. The conclusion then claims that people can perceive 
dynamic information even when the stimuli being inspected are 
static. These findings were in contrast with most theories of 
static form perception at that time (e.g. Kosslyn, 1980) and 
they created questions pertaining not only to the role that 
the ability to represent dynamics may play in perceiving 
things other than letters, but they also raised issues 
relating to which properties of the mental representation 
actually become dynamic. 
These questions prompted Freyd to begin further 
investigations into the role that movement may play in aiding 
our perception in other areas. She surmised, that if it could 
be shown empirically that the representation of movement 
occurred under static conditions, then it would indeed suggest 
that the mental representation of movement is a fundamental 
organizing principle for human perception. 
In the spirit of Shephard's (1984) assertion that "the 
internalization of the world's regularities will become 
apparent in situations of incomplete and impoverished input", 
she proposed that one of the best methods to test the 
importance of movement perception would be in a case where 
technically no movement was actually present, but instead was 
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simply implied. In order to explore this premise, Freyd asked 
subjects to view a series of photographs of natural visual 
events (e.g. waves crashing, animals moving, a person jumping 
off a wall) which provided rich cues to convey the inherent 
movement. Subjects looked at a photograph (presented 
tachistoscopically) for 250 msec, and after a brief interval 
(250 msec) their memory for these scenes was tested. They had 
been instructed only to look for subtle differences between 
each pair of photographs, but no mention of movement was made. 
The results, based on reaction time data, clearly indicated 
that subjects found it more difficult to reject distracters 
when these were photographs of the same scene shot slightly 
later in time rather than equally earlier in time (Freyd, 
1983b) 
It appeared then, that the motion cues in the photographs 
were in some way capable of inducing a mental representation 
which captured the movements an observer would experience if 
he was actually present and observing the scene in person. 
This compelling mental "visualization" was so effective in 
capturing the dynamic properties, that it created a problem 
for memory when subjects were asked to accurately recall what 
they saw. This apparent dynamic quality associated with 
imagery was not a new development, since various 
"transformational" properties of mental images had been well 
documented as a consequence of the mental rotation research 
undertaken by Roger Shepard and his colleagues (e.g. Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971; Shepard & Feng, 1972; Cooper & Podgorny, 1976; 
Shepard & Cooper, 1982). However, these transformations were 
described as "processes" which people performed on static 
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represent at ions of an object ( Shepard, 1981) , therefore the 
idea of people being able to represent the motion implied in 
photographs by forming dynamic mental representations, was a 
rather different assertion. 
"REPRESENTATIONAL MOMENTUM" 
The photographs in the previous experiments set out to 
capture naturally occurring scenes depicting "real world" 
action, in which the motion displayed was strongly implied as 
well as being both unidirectional and irreversible. Yet, the 
possibility that subjects could have deduced the motion 
involved by understanding the meaning implicit in the 
photograph (i.e. semantic assessment) rather than actually 
representing the dynamic properties inherent in the scene, 
could not be totally rejected. Therefore Freyd set herself the 
task of developing a more suitable method of reliably 
establishing and measuring this effect. 
In a subsequent investigation, an attempt was made to 
measure changes in the mental representation of a visually 
presented geometric pattern, in which implied reversible 
motion had been induced by way of a prior sequence of static 
displays (Freyd & Finke, 1984). The central aim of this 
research was to demonstrate that mental representations of an 
object undergoing an implied transformation, are capable of 
exhibiting an inertial property seemingly analogous to the 
momentum displayed by the physically moving object. In this 
experiment a static rectangle was displayed for 250 msec, at 
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three successive orientations, separated temporarily by inter-
stimulus intervals (ISis) of 250 msec to give the impression 
of coherent motion. Each orientation was separated by an 
equivalent angular distance (approximately 17°) thereby 
implying a smooth rotation of the rectangle around its central 
axis, at a constant angular velocity (see Figure 1) 
Figure 1: 
2 3 Test 
Schematic diagram of a clockwise trial (copied 
from Kelly & Freyd, 1987, pg 375) 
Each experimental trial consisted of a coherent inducing 
sequence made up of three presentations of the rectangle in 
the manner described above. Subjects were instructed to watch 
the three presentations (whilst focusing their eyes on a 
fixation point on the screen to prevent them tracking the 
mot ion) and to remember the orientation of the third 
rectangle. After a retention period of 250 msec, a fourth 
rectangle (probe) was presented. This was either exactly the 
same as the third presentation (50% of trials), or else very 
slightly different. This difference manifested itself in one 
of two ways. In half of the remaining trials, this probe 
represented a slight clockwise rotation of approximately 6°, 
whilst the remainder of trials displayed an anti-clockwise 
rotation of exactly the same amount. Subjects were instructed 
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to decide as quickly as possible if the '~robe" rectangle had 
the same orientation as the one they had been instructed to 
remember. 
Results indicated that subjects found it much harder to 
detect any differences in orientation between the probe and 
the third rectangle in the inducing set, when the probe 
followed the direction of the implied motion. In this 
experiment, subjects took on average 216 msec longer and made 
almost 7 times as many errors, rejecting the forwardly rotated 
probes compared with the backwardly rotated ones. It was 
conjectured that subjects were less likely to reject the 
forwardly displaced orientation, because this position was 
most similar to their actual memory of the orientation of the 
final stimulus in the inducing set. However, when the ordering 
of the first two orientations was reversed so that the 
impression of a consistent path of motion was no longer 
created ( incoherent sequence); the difference between the 
forward and backward probes was no longer apparent. This 
result shows that a consistent path of rotation, implying 
continuous movement, is required to produce the memory 
displacement effect. 
The same outcome was produced (although in less 
pronounced terms) when the temporal spacing bet ween the 
inducing stimuli was doubled to 500 msec. At these longer 
intervals it was considered highly unlikely that any 
perception of "apparent motion" was occurring. Therefore, the 
subjective experience of "seeing" movement must have been a 
cognitive process rather than a perceptual illusion of 
movement per se. A conclusion that this memory distortion 
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appe~red to be independent of elementary sensory processing 
was therefore postulated, based on the assumption that a 
cognitively based influence was causing the memory for an 
object's final position to change along its implicit path of 
motion. The term "Representational Momentum" was introduced to 
describe this memory displacement effect. This name was in 
reference to the apparent inertial property that seemingly 
becomes associated with this mental process. 
This experimental design came to be viewed as the 
standard procedure for demonstrating representational momentum 
effects, and the memory displacement effects proved to be 
easily replicated and very robust. The memory distortions were 
observed in virtually all the research participants, and they 
persisted even when repeated error feedback was given during 
practice trials and the final orientation in the inducing 
sequence was the same for all trials ( Finke & Freyd, 1985 ; 
Freyd, 1987 ) This weakens any argument suggesting that the 
observed "over-shoot" occurred because people had trouble 
either stopping the forward motion or else mentally 
registering the fact that it had stopped. This is due to the 
fact that there was no uncertainty about where the object 
would stop on each trial because the same end point was used 
each time. Furthermore, any claim that this pattern of results 
may reflect a natural tendency to extrapolate forward movement 
per se can also be rejected because a slight change to the 
procedure was introduced to specifically assess this factor . 
Freyd & Finke, 1984 ; Finke & Freyd, 1985 ; and Finke & Shyi, 
1988 , gave subjects explicit instructions to extrapolate the 
implied motion to what was considered to be the next step in 
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the sequence. Subjects were very accurate at performing this 
task, and there was no tendency towards over-estimating the 
distance the object was expected to travel. This control 
condition also provided evidence to negate any claims that 
subjects in the memory task could have mistakenly treated it 
as an extrapolation task. 
A variant of the basic "same-different" method in which a 
greater number of probe positions were employed, subsequently 
provided a more sensitive method of measuring the size of the 
memory displacement effect (Freyd & Finke, 1985) This more 
sophisticated method used nine closely positioned probes that 
were presented equally often. This had the major advantage of 
enabling quadratic regressions to be carried out on the data, 
thus providing a reliable estimate of exactly how far the 
memories for the final pattern had shifted forward. Results 
obtained using this new measurement method, clearly identified 
a basically symmetrical distribution of "same" responses, with 
the apex of the curve centred slightly in advance of "true 
same". That is, subjects responded "same" ID.Q.tl often to the 
orientation that was just slightly forward of the one that was 
actually correct. This forward shift was calculated to be 
approximately 10-12% of the distance between the final 
position in the inducing sequence and what would have been the 
next step in a continuing progression (Finke et al 1986). This 
led to the prediction that in any future studies, a test 
pattern shifted forward by approximately 1/10 of the fully 
extrapolated distance would be accepted as the remembered 
pattern most often, and most rapidly by the subject. In cases 
where this position is correctly rejected, subjects should 
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then take a significantly greater time to register their 
decision. 
All the memory distortions noted in the previous studies 
occurred in the direction of the implied motion, and this led 
Freyd and colleagues to theoiize that when a person perceives 
an object as moving (whether the motion be real or implied), 
inherent in the perception is the fact that the object will 
continue its forward motion in the immediate future. The 
theory claims that this forward momentum cannot be instantly 
halted, and instead a viewer must deliberately attempt to stop 
it. This results in the implied motion continuing for some 
distance beyond the point at which this cognitlve "stopping 
signal" was first applied. This has the effect of creating a 
small forward shift in memory for an object's last observed 
position. The term "representational momentum" was thus an 
analogy to the tendency for a physically moving object to 
continue along its path of motion after attempts to halt the 
movement have been initiated. 
EXTENSIONS OF THE PHENOMENON 
In later experiments Freyd and her colleagues sought to 
determine the range of conditions that must be present in 
order to reliably predict the momentum effect, and at the same 
time they attempted to establish if the phenomenon could be 
extended to other types of implied motion. 
An initial task was to determine if it is the 
representation of a particular object that becomes distorted, 
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or whether it is the representation of an abstract spatial 
position that is transformed. The latter case seemed an 
unlikely proposition since the earlier mental rotation studies 
had already shown that in those tasks, subjects were imagining 
the rotation of a concrete object or pattern, rather than just 
an abstract frame of reference pertaining to a particular 
orientation (Cooper & Shepard, 1973; 1975 cited in Finke, 
1989). In an attempt to ascertain object identity requirements 
with representational momentum, study participants were 
presented with objects differing in shape and texture (Kelly & 
Freyd, 1987) . When figures with radically differing shapes 
were presented within a sequence, with the change attempting 
to imply a rotation of these figures (Exp. 2), no forward 
distortions in the subjects' memories were noted. Under these 
conditions it was assumed that subjects just observed separate 
objects at differing orientations, without actually perceiving 
any movement. However, when a figure retained the same basic 
shape but instead had its dimensions altered in a minor way 
(Exp.3 & Exp.5) the memory distortions again became apparent. 
It was suggested that in this case the overall figure stayed 
similar enough for the visual system to conclude that it was 
the same object at differing orientations (Exp.3) or locations 
(Exp.5). Similarly, when the internal markings of an object 
were manipulated while the outline of the shape remained 
unchanged, thereby giving the impression of textural change 
(Exp.4), a memory displacement was again noted. In this case 
it would appear that the internal changes that were introduced 
were not enough to break down the object centred requirement. 
It is important to note however that the memory distortions 
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found in the above manipulations were by no means as large as 
would normally be anticipated. 
From these studies it seemed reasonable to conclude that 
for representational momentum to occur at all, some level of 
object identity must be achieved. An observance of a 
correspondence between the basic contour of the objects 
presented to them, appeared to be the main criteria used by 
the subjects in making this assumption. This notion is in 
accordance with Shepard's (1984) observations resulting from 
apparent motion studies, in which he concluded that the visual 
system prefers transformations that preserve the rigidity of 
an object. It would appear then that the memory distortions 
noted in the above experiments resulted from subjects 
visualizing a particular object as moving rather than 
perceiving some generalized shapes merely shifting in 
orientation or location. 
It is important to note here however, 
centred" requirement took on a new 
that this "object 
complexity when 
representational momentum was reported in relation to a tonal 
sequence which implied a movement along the pitch scale (Kelly 
& Freyd, 1987; Freyd, Kelly & DeKay, 1990) . These studies 
employed a procedure that was identical to previous studies 
except that the inducing sequence consisted of computer 
generated tones of differing frequencies. This provided the 
impression of a tone rising and falling in pitch. The results 
produced the typical momentum effects in regard to both error 
rate and reaction times, and in doing so, showed that the 
phenomenon is not specifically tied to the visual domain. 
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While it is rather more difficult to think of a tone as 
conforming to the traditional criteria used in the visual 
sphere to specify an object, it must be noted that we normally 
have little trouble determining either where a sound comes 
from, or which object it is associated with. This must be 
accomplished by identifying the various physical attributes of 
the sound source and linking-them together in some cohesive 
manner to either relate them to a particular object or 
localize them in space. While there is scant evidence about 
auditory imagery in the literature, investigators have so far 
assumed that auditory imagery will be related to audition in 
much the same way that visual imagery is to vision (Intons-
Peterson, 1992). Since two central determinants of auditory 
experience are Loudness (intensity) and Pitch (frequency), it 
is assumed that these will also make a major contribution to 
auditory imagery as well as to our perception of auditory 
"objects" generally. 
Freyd nevertheless reached the conclusion that 
Representational Momentum appears to be a general phenomenon 
that is not limited to vision or to implied movement of rigid 
objects. Instead she stated "I would expect to find 
Representational Momentum for any dimension of continuous 
change - but not discontinuous change - that can be mentally 
extrapolated" (Freyd, 1987, p.435). It is therefore expected 
that memory displacement effects could be quite widespread. 
Two studies (Finke & Freyd, 1985; Finke, Shyi and Freyd, 
1986) provided evidence in support of this claim by showing 
that the momentum effect also occurred when the implied 
motions of individual parts of a more complex pattern were 
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moved in consistent, yet separate, directions. In these 
studies, the first three patterns in the inducing sequence 
depicted independence motions of dots from one of two starting 








Figure l. Example of display sequences used in practice and experimental tri~ls. ~Follo;~~gta fit~n;!s~~ 
he 4 dot attems were presented for 250 ms each, separated by !Sis rangmg rom o : · 
~ubj~~t~~f :!;a:t~~~e:~~~~:rc:lt~~ft ~~t~~~~:;~~~~i~:~~t(~~o ~:;::ts ~~t~~r;~~~~~~j~tt~e i:;i~7 i; 
:~ems) depicied independent translations of the dots. The particu_la~ inducing pattemt show~ ~:ed~~~::~ 
to half of the subjects, whereas a different set of patterns: 1ep1c~mg opposite mo 10ns o . . , urred 
presented to the· other half. The test pattern in _this ~xample is identical to thf mem~ry pat~e:it~~~s ~~aller 
on half of the trials. For purposes of illustrat10n, the dots are drawn at a arger size, and 5 ~..1. 
viewing field than in the actual displays (see text).] C~1el ¾0-rn n"'~'"' + t'.--e~ J \9'8 fl~ 1 · 
Here the participants were instructed to watch each of 
the four dot patterns in sequence whilst keeping their eyes 
fixed on the centre of the screen. Emphasis was placed on the 
fact that they must watch all three dots at once, as opposed 
to just trying to track one. Again, error rates and reaction 
times for rejecting the probe pattern were substantially 
higher in cases where the pattern was displaced slightly 
forward in the direction of the implied motion. 
These studies were also important in helping to rule out 
the possibility that the memory distortions found in the 
rectangle orientation studies, may have been caused by 
subjects visually "tracking" a rigid object perceived to be 
moving at a constant rate and in a fixed direction. This is 
not possible in the more complex array where individual dots 
simultaneously move in different directions. It is still 
1 5 
possible however, that subjects may have intentionally chosen 
not to heed the instructions and instead just watched the 
displacement of a single dot in the pattern. 
FREYD'S THEORY OF DYNAMIC REPRESENTATIONS 
It has previously been reported (e.g. Gibson, 1966; 
Johanssen, 197 6) that humans appear to be extremely well 
adapted for perceiving and analysing motion and change when 
they are presented with dynamic stimuli. However Freyd' s 
theory of dynamic representation goes beyond an ability to 
perceive events which change over time as it also embodies the 
notion of perceiving dynamic information even when the stimuli 
being viewed are static. Freyd contends that the 
demonstrations showing dynamic information to be relevant 
where it was previously thought mainly static information was 
used, may in fact, indicate that dynamic information could be 
primary to the perceptual system. 
The formulation of her theory grew initially from her 
observation that people appear capable of forming a mental 
image of the motion inherent in a photograph, as has been 
outlined in an earlier section of this review (Freyd, 1983b). 
A seemingly related ability had previously been alluded to by 
Arnheim, 1972, 1974 (cited in Freyd, 1987 & 1992) when he 
affirmed that a key component of static art appreciation 
appears to be the excitement generated by the implied dynamics 
of the art form. This position gained further impetus when 
empirical evidence was provided to show that even the 
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perception of completely static objects can involve a 
representation of the underlying forces inherent in the 
display (Freyd, Pantzer & Cheng, 1988). 
Prior to this, most of the imagery research had been 
concerned with the characteristics of our mental 
representations (i.e. what information is represented and how 
this information is encoded) .- This led to the much published 
debates in the cognitive literature between those who argued 
that we code things abstractly, and those who maintained we 
use encoding principles that are analogous to the ways in 
which things could be part of a real world event (i.e. Imagery 
versus Propositional theorists - see Finke, 1989 for a recent 
review) . Following this, a good deal of work was directed 
towards the study of the transformational properties of the 
images (e.g. Shepard & colleagues mental rotation studies), 
which led to the conclusion that when people perform a mental 
transformation on an object, they appear to engage in 
processes that are functionally similar to those they use when 
presented with a physical object. These results also 
identified the fact that imagery can be a dynamic process, 
because their subjects showed that they were capable of 
mentally visualizing and operating on various objects and 
events. However it is important to note, that at this stage, 
the representations themselves were not seen to possess any 
dynamic qualities. Instead it was proposed that we engage in 
mental "processes" (Shepard, 1981) that act on the images and 
transform them in our minds. 
At this time the standard idea of a mental representation 
was that of a "mental thing" or "data structure" (see 
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Anderson, 1990) and most of the research to date had concerned 
itself with the types of mental processes that could be 
performed on these images. This tends to force a notion of a 
representation that is implicitly static. Freyd's work however 
has altered this view by showing that the images themselves 
must become dynamic to enable people to capture and represent 
the mot ion that is inherent in them. In most of Freyd' s 
studies there has clearly been no sensory basis for the 
detection of the dynamic information, therefore it cannot be 
said to be a perceptual illusion (as is the case with 
"apparent motion" or in some cases of implied motion, where 
motion detectors become "fooled" into thinking something is 
moving) Since subjects have managed to abstract the motion 
from the implied sequences of static displays, the perception 
of the movement cannot be direct. Consequently, the subjects 
must have made inferences from what they saw (cf. Shepard, 
1984; 1987) and formed some kind of cognitive representation 
on this basis. 
Freyd's view of dynamic representation is also different 
from previous notions of representation, in that~ is said 
to be an inherent quality (Freyd, 1987; 1992). Previously it 
had been assumed that any temporal effects associated with 
mental transformations (e.g. rotation or scanning rates) had 
resulted from constraints on our ability to process the 
spatial information inherent in the image. However Freyd 
claims that when a mental representation is actively invoked 
in working memory, the temporal dimension is represented 
"analogically" (i.e. much as it is in the real world) 
therefore the temporal changes directly reflect what occurs 
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naturally. Freyd in fact maintains that in dynamic 
representations "time represents time" (Freyd, 1992). 
If this is an accurate assertion, the temporal component 
must be shown to be unidirectional (i.e time in the real world 
goes forward), and it must be continuous (i.e. between any two 
points of time another point 
substantiate this claim-




representational momentum paradigm, when it was shown that the 
motion attached to the representation of an object is always 
extrapolated forward into the future and this movement seems 
to be represented in a continuous fashion. When subject's 
memories were probed at a variety of retention intervals 
ranging from 10 to 90 msecs, their memory shifts were shown to 
increase in a linear fashion, with predictable minute 
increases being recorded between each small retention time 
period (Freyd & Johnson, 1987) 
These empirical findings also had important implications 
for theories of how memories change. Firstly they showed that 
movement can influence how we perceive and remember things 
even when the movement information is only implied or simply 
inferred. In these cases the people were highly motivated not 
to allow their memories to be altered in any way because the 
task required them to be very exact in their recall of the 
final position. Therefore it is highly probable that in 
certain natural everyday situations, where the motivation to 
be accurate is not so strong, memory impairments could well be 
more pronounced. 
These memory distortions have also been shown to occur 
very rapidly (i.e. retention intervals as low as 30 msec have 
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produced the desired effects (Freyd & Johnson, 1987), thereby 
indicating that the mechanism underlying the memory 
displacement effect is in the domain of "working memory". This 
was a significant finding, because up until that time, memory 
research had been mainly concerned with how visual memories 
stored in "long term memory" could be distorted following 
either long term retention (e:g. Bartlett, 1932; Tversky, 1981 
or Goldmeir, 1982), or as a result of biasing information 
presented prior to retrieval (Loftus, 1975; Loftus, Miller & 
Burns, 1978; Mccloskey & Zaragosa, 1985). 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REPRESENTATIONAL AND PHYSICAL 
PROCESSES 
While Freyd and colleagues initially used the proposed 
correspondence between physical momentum and representational 
momentum only as an analogy to describe the way mental 
extrapolations were stopped (Finke & Freyd, & Shyi, 1986), 
they later extended this analogy to embody the notion that 
the two processes were in fact very similar. This viewpoint 
appears to have as its roots, Shepard's (1981, 1984) 
speculation that the most enduring characteristics of the 
environment have been internalized into our perceptual system 
during the course of our evolutionary history. This 
theoretical stance arguing for an analogy between mental 
transformations and their external states is not new, as this 
position has received extensive coverage in the congitive 
literature over the years. 
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There has been much empirical support for this 
perspective from both the mental rotation studies (e.g. 
Cooper, 1976; Shepard & Chipman, 1976) and imagery scanning 
experiments (e.g. Kosslyn, Ball & Reisser, 1978). The mental 
rotation research indicated that transformations of imagined 
objects exhibit dynamic characteristics similar to those of 
their physical counterparts, -and that the mental processing 
is carried out in a holistic and continuous manner. The 
imagery scanning experiments on the other hand discovered 
(from studies requiring imaginary scanning of objects, or the 
use of cognitive maps in spatial navigational tasks), that as 
a rule, the spatial relations among objects are preserved in 
images. 
These findings prompted Finke (cited in Finke, 1989) to 
make a general proposal about the relationship between 
imaginal transformations and their physical counterparts, 
which he termed the "principle of transformational 
equivalence". This made a claim that imagined and physical 
transformations exhibit similar dynamic characteristics, with 
each being controlled by the same laws of motion. If the 
mental and physical processes are analogous, it would be 
expected that both would follow the same regularities; and 
the factors that influence one, should also be shown to 
affect the other. The aim of Freyd' s subsequent empirical 
work therefore was to explore this hypothesis by examining 
the extent to which the internal properties of physical 
motion were able to successfully predict aspects of their 
representational counterparts. 
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Since physical momentum is proportional to velocity, one 
would predict greater memory shifts to occur with increased 
implied velocity. This prediction was successfully borne out 
with the demonstration that representational distortions 
increased linearly with implied velocity (Freyd & Finke, 
1985), thereby signifying that the strength of the 
extrapolation tendency is determined by the momentum 
associated with the implied motion. This velocity dependence 
of the memory shift was later extended to situations where 
the inducing sequence implied a consistent change in velocity 
(Finke, Freyd & Shyi, 1986) In these investigations, 
subjects were shown sequences which implied that an object 
was moving either at a constant velocity, a constant 
acceleration, or a constant deceleration, but where the 
average implied velocity remained the same. This manipulation 
of the acceleration was achieved by varying the inter-
stimulus interval ( ISI) between the items in an inducing 
sequence. For example, a long ISI between the 1st-2nd· display 
and a short ISI between the 3rd-4th display represented an 
acceleration while the opposite pattern was consistent with 
deceleration. As would be predicted from the principles of 
physical momentum, the resultant memory shifts were shown to 
be determined by the final implied velocity rather than the 
average velocity within the sequence. Furthermore, it was 
shown that when the inducing sequence implied a deceleration 
to a final predicted velocity of zero, the memory shift was 
eliminated. 
When these findings were incorporated with additional 
empirical data which indicated that the internal rates at 
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which transformations were performed in representational 
momentum studies, closely approximated the external rates of 
physical momentum (Freyd & Johnson, 1987), it seemed that many 
of the quantitative aspects of the momentum effect coincided 
quite closely with expectations based on the physical model. 
These correspondences presented a persuasive argument in 
favour of the notion that -at least some aspects of the 
inertial properties of motion have been incorporated into 
mental events. Of even greater interest though, was the fact 
that subjects in the above experiments showed memory 
distortions that were determined by the implied changes of 
acceleration within a display, as this suggested that the 
subjects were sensitive to the magnitude of the forces 
inherent in the sequence. This led Freyd to speculate that we 
may have an underlying representation of physical forces 
incorporated into our perceptual system (cf. Shepard, 1984; 
1987). 
An important study which has been interpreted as 
evidence for this argument is that of Freyd, Pantzer & Cheng 
(1988). Here it was claimed that subjects exhibited memory 
distortions which were said to be indicative of their ability 
to represent the underlying forces held in equilibrium, in a 
static display. In the first of these experiments subjects 
were shown a drawing of two objects, one supporting the other 
(e.g. a plant sitting on a plant stand). These were displayed 
next to a larger object (a window) which provided a spatial 
framework. The task required subjects to remember the plant's 
position. After a short interval a drawing of the previously 
supported object (i.e. plant) was shown beside the window in 
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exactly the same position as before, but without the 
supporting surface. In this case the plant was in a state 
where the forces were now in disequilibrium. Finally, a probe 
display, showing the plant adjacent to the window at either 
the same vertical position as before or else slightly above or 
below its initial position, was presented. Subjects were then 
asked to indicate if they thought the plant was in the same or 
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Figure J. Schematic depiction of the stimuli used in Experiment I. The first row shows the three 
display$. used in a trial beginning with the table as a support object and ending with the test display 
showing the plant in the original position. The second row shows a comparable trial for the hook 
condition. Timing of displays and intervals is irn,.licated at the bottom of the figure. 
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It was determined that subjects would respond "same" 
most often for probes depicting the plant slightly below its 
original location. That of course is the direction it would 
have moved in ieai life had the support been removed. In a 
control condition it was discovered that no memory 
displacement occurred when the plant was initially displayed 
without support. Freyd' s analysis is further strengthened 
with the work of Hubbard & Bharucha (1988), who, by using an 
apparent motion paradigm to test for memory distortions 
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similar to those found by Freyd and colleagues, noted that 
the magnitude of the memory displacements relating to the 
vanishing point of a target travelling at a uniform velocity 
in a linear fashion, was influenced by the direction of the 
motion. They discovered a consistently greater downward 
displacement for horizontal motion, and a greater 
displacement for vertical t-op-to bottom motion than for 
upwards movement. These findings suggested to them the 
possibility of an internalization of a downward gravitational 
influence. 
An extension of work in this area has also revealed that 
the representation of forces can involve cases that are more 
complex than simple conditions involving only gravity. Freyd 
et al. 1988 also showed subjects drawings depicting a coiled 
spring which was either shown alone, or with a box resting on 
top of it. Memory for the level of compression of this spring 
was tested by either adding or removing the box from the 
drawing. It was predicted that subjects would display an 
upward shift in one memory condition (i.e. decompression of 
spring) and a downward shift in the other (i.e. compression 
condition). The results successfully indicated that memory 
for observed compression was distorted in the predictable 
direction, given the disruption to the spring's equilibrium 
by the implied addition or removal of a weighted object. 
The studies cited in this section provide strong evidence 
in support of the notion that the observed memory distortions 
are attributable to mental representations which are rich 
analogues of actual physical processes. In these studies, 
factors that are known to affect physical momentum (i.e. 
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changes in acceleration; the final velocity of an object; and 
gravitational influences) have also been shown to relate to 
the magnitude of representational momentum, as measured by the 
degree of distortion in a subject 1 s memory for the final 
position of an object. The only factor that has not yet been 
studied empirically is the relationship between an object's 
mass and the influence this has on representational momentum. 
If the relationship holds as hypothesized, it would be 
predicted that memory displacements should also become 
apparent when objects of obviously differing size and weights 
are presented in salient situations. 
Freyd (refer Freyd, 1987; 
Pantzer & Cheng, 1988; Freyd, 
Kelly & Freyd, 
1992) 
1987; Freyd, 
that the observed effects are the 
has repeatedly claimed 
result of encapsulated 
informational processing - specifically perceptual modularity 
(cf. Fodor, 1983). This modularity thesis assumes that 
knowledge is embedded in the perceptual/representational 
system, and that perceptual analysis is completely self-
contained and therefore isolated from our beliefs and 
expectations in the Semantic/Conceptual system. It is however 
important to note that this claim is at variance with earlier 
findings by Mccloskey et al. ( 1980, 1983) who presented 
results revealing that people display misconceptions about 
inertia. McCloskey's findings appear contrary to the view that 
we have accurately internalized the laws governing physical 
motion. Questions pertaining to the analogue nature of 











The fact that representational momentum and the 
accompanying forward memory shifts have been obtained in areas 
where there appears to be no single analog to the motion of 
physical objects, appears a• 1ittle problematic for Freyd' s 
theory, as its central tenet is the analogy to an object being 
stopped in the physical world. 
Firstly, it has been observed that various 
quadrilateral figures which implied a change in size and shape 
in the inducing stage, also elicited memory distortions 
similar to those found for rotations and translations which 
more specifically suggested motion (Kelly & Freyd, 1987) . 
While changes in shape and size are not generally thought to 
be governed by laws of motion it was postulated that in the 
latter case the findings could represent an abstract 
relationship with physical movement because all the subjects 
in this experiment made a subjective report of experiencing 
"motion in depth". This arose because the displays changing in 
size in a regular manner gave the impression of an object 
advancing toward them or conversely retreating back into the 
distance. One interesting finding from this particular set of 
experiments, stemmed from the observation that when a sequence 
of rectangles was shown to become more square-like in 
appearance, resulting in the final memory figure being a 
perfect square, no memory distortion was evident at all. The 
reason for this cannot be fully ascertained as there are two 
possible explanations. Firstly, subjects may have identified 
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the fact that the shape was a square and therefore encoded the 
semantic category. This information could have taken 
precedence over any spatial changes thereby effectively 
halting or over-riding the usual internal transformations. If 
this was the case, it would be very detrimental to Freyd' s 
modularity theory as a conceptual influence would seem to have 
penetrated the task. However, another possibility is that in 
this case, unlike the others, the transformation involved a 
complete change in the dimension of the object (i.e. both the 
width and length were altered). This may have been too complex 
for the visual system to deal with, or it may simply not be 
indicative of a usual transformation of an object. 
More significant however was the discovery that changes 
in the pitch of a tone were also noted to produce 
representational momentum, along with the predicted forward 
memory shifts and the previously identified acceleration and 
velocity effects. This appears to raise some genuine 
challenges for the analog proposition, 
do not typically specify a change 
sounding object. 
since changes in pitch 
in the position of a 
While a detailed analysis of the correlation between 
pitch and motion has, to my knowledge, not been undertaken, 
there are those who have argued for a relationship. Finke & 
Shepard, 198 6; ( cited by Intons-Peterson, 1992) maintain that 
in the auditory domain the thing that is most analogous to the 
perception of visual objects is the perception of "auditory 
objects in pitch space". Pitch space is viewed as a complex 
medium within which auditory objects (e.g. tones, voices, 
chords, environmental sounds) can be rigidly transformed while 
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preserving their structure. As a consequence, it has been 
claimed that many of the musically most significant 
transformations, including shifts up and down the scale, 
correspond to rotations in this space. 
Finke & Freyd (1988) also noted that memory shifts were 
larger when the direction of the mental extrapolation was 
always the same on every trial than when it varied 
unpredictably from trial to trial. Similarly, Hubbard & 
Bharucha (1988) and Hubbard (1990) discovered that when the 
transformation is subjectively continuous, the memory 
displacements are especially pronounced. It has also been 
reported that by increasing the number of inducing stimuli 
from three to four, one can increase the level of memory 
displacement (Freyd & Johnson, 198 7) . Physical momentum of 
course does not depend on the familiarity of an object or how 
consistently a particular motion has been repeated in the 
past. 
For a strict analogy to physical momentum to hold it 
would be necessary for the memory distortions to always occur 
in the direction of the motion of the inducing sequence. The 
continuity of the change has always implied that it can be 
extrapolated in the direction of the movement, and the rate at 
which this occurs will correspond to that of the inducing 
sequence. More recent experimental work has, however, begun to 
cast doubt on this claim. Firstly, Hubbard & Bharucha (1988) 
uncovered an unequivocal cognitive effect which influenced the 
extent of the exhibited memory distortions. These researchers 
used a radically different experimental paradigm to assess the 
level of memory displacement following the abrupt 
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disappearance of a rapidly moving target. Subjects were 
required to observe a small dot travelling across a computer 
screen before it suddenly disappeared. They were then 
requested to pinpoint the exact position the dot had 
disappeared by operating the computer mouse and placing the 
cursor over the point of disappearance. The results indicated 
that when the target travelled in a uniform direction and at a 
constant speed, then memory displacements similar to those 
found by Freyd and colleagues were noted. However, when the 
inducing sequence was altered slightly to give the impression 
that the target either collided with a frame or was about to 
bang into it at the time it vanished, the memory distortions 
were observed to be in the anticipated direction based on 
knowledge of what was likely to occur after impact. 
These results consequently exhibited a negative memory 
shift by Freyd's standards because the distortions moved in 
the direction opposite to that of the current path of the 
motion. However it was evident that there still seemed to be a 
striking tendency for subjects to mentally extrapolate the 
motion into the future as Freyd and colleagues had previously 
contended, although in this case the extrapolation process 
appeared to be calculated on the bas is of what one would 
expect to occur given the change of circumstances. It becomes 
apparent then, that rather than being a simple extrapolation 
of the motion as previously thought, a higher level cognitive 
influence appears to respond to foreseen changes in the 
target's behaviour and the memory is displaced in the 
direction related to this anticipatory process. 
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While Hubbard & Bharucha concluded that their "memory 
displacement effect" was equivalent to the representational 
momentum phenomenon discovered by Freyd et al, their claim is 
subject to criticism for a number of reasons. Firstly, they 
used an apparent motion paradigm to induce the effect, whereby 
subjects were likely to experience the sensory effects of 
motion, rather than forming a representation of discrete 
memory patterns. Secondly, these researchers did not include 
a control condition to determine how subjects would 
extrapolate the motion in the experiments which saw the target 
bounce within the confines of the frame (Exps. 4 & 5) . In 
these situations, subjects should have been asked to indicate 
where they felt the target would go, under each of the three 
conditions (i.e. pre-collision, collision and post-collision). 
In this way, it would have been possible to determine if their 
memory for the vanishing point was displaced along the same 
representational pathway as that used to extrapolate the 
motion. Finke & Shyi (1988) have argued that this is 
important to their theory, since the memory shifts are 
supposed to occur along the same representational pathways 
used in mental extrapolation. 
Finally, Hubbard & Bharucha's claim that their paradigm 
is equivalent to a variant of the Representation Momentum 
paradigm is open to dispute, because the interval between 
disappearance of the target and indication of the vanishing 
point, was at least 2 seconds or greater. The observation of 
a considerable positive memory shift is in opposition to the 
findings of Freyd & Johnson (1987), who would predict negative 
shifts with such a long retention interval. 
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To overcome such criticism, two subsequent researchers 
(Verfaillie & d 'Ydewalle, 1990) decided to reinstate the 
standard momentum inducing sequence and procedure in an 
attempt to further investigate this "anticipatory hypothesis" 
alluded to by Hubbard and Bharucha. 
In their experimental strategy, subjects were shown two 
display sequences. In the ~first condition, the standard 
representational momentum inducing sequence showing the 
implied rotation of a rectangle at three separate orientations 
around a path of rotation was presented (e.g. Freyd & Finke, 
1984) The results obtained from this part of the study were 
then compared with a second condition in which the same 
inducing sequence as above was preceded by six other images, 
to give the impression of it being part of a more complex 
event. In this latter case, the rotation direction changed 
periodically in a predictable manner, and the sequence was 
organized in such a way as to imply a change of direction 
opposite to that of the local motion path at the time the 
memory pattern was presented. It was argued that if the 
momentum effect only involves an extrapolation of the local 
style of change, then the memory shift should be the same for 
both conditions because the three images prior to the test 
pattern presentation were the same for both conditions. 
Verfaillie & d'Ydewalle however found clear differences 
between the two conditions. Firstly, in the initial condition, 
which was a direct replication of Freyd's original experiment, 
the predicted memory distortions were clearly discernable, yet 
32 
when a direction change was implied in the second condition, 
the memory shift dropped almost back to zero. This tends to 
suggest that when viewers are presented with a coherent 
complex style of change, they anticipate the future course of 
events on the basis of the episode as a whole, rather than on 
the current motion path, as the analog to physical momentum 
would predict. These new developments also indicate that the 
class of changing patterns we are able to extrapolate, is much 
richer than a simple analogy to representational momentum 
dictates. Furthermore they provide evidence to demonstrate 
that the additional complexity of the inducing stage can lead 
to more diverse memory distortions than those found by Freyd 
and colleagues in their experiments involving simple monotonic 
translations or rotations. 
It is of interest to note here, Freyd has previously 
stated that representational momentum will occur in any 
dimension affording continuous change, so long as this change 
could be extrapolated into the future (Finke & Freyd, & Shyi, 
1986). She substantiated this claim by showing that 
permutations in the inducing display (i.e. incoherent 
sequences) no longer created distortions in memory. However, 
in Verfaillie & d'Ydewalle's study, the inducing sequence was 
not coherent in terms of following an a-b-c pattern, but it 
was predictable in that it was made up of eight inducing 
patterns in which the orientation of the rectangle changed 
periodically in a foreseeable manner. It now appears that it 
may not necessarily be the coherence of the sequences as such 
which created the memory distortions found in Freyd's 
experiments; but rather the predictable nature of the 
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unfolding event. If this is the case, it could be suggested 
that Freyd' s incoherent sequences could also be shown to 
exhibit "momentum-like" qualities if the pattern was repeated 
a few times within the inducing stage. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON 
REPRESENTATIONAL MOMENTUM 
Freyd has argued that representational momentum fits 
Pylyshyn' s (1981) criteria of "cognitive impenetrability" in 
that subjects cannot instantly halt the represented movement 
no matter what they think or attempt. (Freyd 1992) However the 
assumption of cognitive penetrability seems dubious in light 
of the research findings of Kelly & Freyd, 1987. In their 
experiment studying auditory moment (Exp. 8), these 
researchers noted a marked difference between musically 
trained subjects and those without the musical experience. 
Their memory for tones rising and falling in pitch, was 
tested. While the latter group were shown to exhibit the 
predicted momentum effects, those with musical training were 
excluded from the analysis because not one of the subjects 
made an error. Kelly & Freyd argued that the intervals 
between the tones were simply not confusing enough for 
listeners trained to perceive pitches. A later study (Freyd, 
Kelly & DeKay) supports this assertion by showing that a 
forward memory asymmetry became apparent for musically trained 
subjects when the probe tones were close in frequency to the 
actual third tone. 
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It appears then, that in particular circumstances, a 
person is able to place a semantic interpretation on the task, 
and encode the stimuli differently. According to Phylshyn, 
this would provide indisputable evidence of cognitive 
penetration. He feels that if a form of an image can be 
altered in a particular way by changing what the subject 
believes the stimulus to be, or changing the subjects 
interpretation of the task, then the explanation must involve 
such constructs as beliefs, goals or tacit knowledge, rather 
than intrinsic properties of some medium. 
The findings of Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988; Hubbard, 1990; 
and Verfaillie & d'Ydewalle, 1991 also seem to indicate, in 
contrast to Freyd, and in opposition to an analogy with 
physical momentum, that the extrapolation forward in time 
seems to pertain to the event as a whole, rather than being 
based on just a local pattern of movement. The size and the 
direction of the memory distortions recorded seem to be 
governed by what a person anticipates is likely to occur in 
the future. Therefore predicability emerges as a major 
factor in the memory displacement effect, yet it still appears 
that this anticipatory process is mandatory. 
The point at which these apparent conceptual influences 
have their effect is not yet known, therefore it is not 
actually possible to dispute Fodor's (1983, 1985) modularity 
thesis of "informational encapsulation" of the perceptual 
modules as they perform their specialized tasks. To falsify 
modularity (i.e. to show a "top-down" influence) it must be 
demonstrated that the effect from the larger context and 
general knowledge is post-perceptual, and that the source of 
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the information is from outside the module. If it is a post-
perceptual influence, it would need to occur very rapidly 
because recall memory has been shown to be affected after 
extremely short retention periods (i.e. under 20 msec), and 
the memory changes appear to be quite resistant to both 
practice and error feedback (Finke & F reyd, 19 8 5) . 
Alternatively, rather than arguing for an "all-or-nothing" 
position, it may be wiser to adopt a previously stated 
position suggesting that the perceptual/representational 
system is hierarchically organised (Finke, 1980; Shepard, 
1984) . In this manner it could be argued that the lower 
processes may be automatic and impenetrable, whereas higher 
processes may be more open to influence by cognitive 
penetration. 
FUNCTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DYNAMIC REPRESENTATION AND 
MANDATORY ANTICIPATION 
Shepard (1981) has argued that the perception of all 
objects depends upon a knowledge of their possible 
transformations. This ability is apparent by the ease with 
which we identify objects that are either partly obscured, or 
else shown at unfamiliar angles. We are able to do this 
because we are adept at correctly recognizing objects from 
many orientations. The premise that we may have stored 
knowledge about each object's possible orientations in long-
term memory to enable a matching process to take place, seems 
to be an unlikely and implausible assumption (ct. Biederman). 
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Instead, it would seem more probable to suppose that we access 
a more abstract form of knowledge from our long-term store, 
and temporarily construct an image, operating on it as if it 
were part of a complete event. 
This ability to present information dynamically has also 
been shown to provide a much enhanced perception of static 
forms, because it allows for- the incorporation of pertinent 
information about the object's possible past or future status. 
This ability may aid recognition (e.g. of handwriting - Freyd, 
1983a) or it may allow for a much richer appreciation of a 
static scene or display (e.g. viewing Art or photographs -
Freyd, 1983b; 1992) 
The ability to represent motion and forces is also said 
to have a degree of adaptive significance because it can help 
us anticipate the future course of events and plan our motor 
actions in our everyday lives. No matter what we do in our 
environment we must co-ordinate our movement with others, 
therefore it is imperative that we not only understand what 
would happen if our actions interfere with others (both 
stationary and mobile objects) but we must also have a 
perceptual system that is capable of representing situations. 
The ability to extrapolate an object beyond a final 
observed position through mandatory anticipation, must also be 
helpful because it enables people to predict the future 
position of objects despite their inability to maintain 
constant eye contact. Reacting to a rapidly moving object 
(e.g. catching a ball or changing position in order to avoid a 
collision) are skills that require accurate anticipation of an 
object's future positions. Similarly, if a moving object 
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becomes temporarily occluded (e.g. a bird flying behind a 
tree) then the ability to mentally extrapolate along the same 
motion path allows not only correct anticipation when it 
finally reappears, but also promotes the conceptual continuity 
of the event. 
PRESENT STUDY: 
Since many living things and moving objects can be seen 
and heard while moving in space, it is assumed that spatial 
representations would be abstract and not tied to any modality 
(Anderson, 1990). Furthermore, since both vision and audition 
deal with object movement, it is expected that auditory 
induced movement would tap into the same system, and hence 
lead to similar memory displacement effects. 
It has been suggested that we group sounds according to 
their spatial origin (Bregman, 1990), therefore if sounds come 
from one place and begin at the same time, we tend to assume 
they most likely have the same source. If the auditory system 
is capable of grouping sounds by their location, it must have 
a method for representing locations on some sort of continuum. 
Space of course is physically a continuum, therefore the 
auditory system should behave as though there are a continuum 
of locations, and to get from one place to another, sounds 
should pass through all the intermediate stages. 
Research by Rhodes (1987) has provided some evidence to 
suggest that auditory spatial information, like visual spatial 
information, is represented analogically. This means that the 
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spatial relations and distance information are directly 
mirrored within the representational system. Therefore it is 
conjectured, if an object is heard to move in space, then by 
analogy to the representational momentum findings of Freyd & 
colleagues, the auditory system should automatically calculate 
the future position of the moving sound. It is therefore 
hypothesised that when a moving sound stops, a person's memory 
for the last heard position will be displaced forward in the 
direction of the movement. 
Four studies are reported, with the aim being, to provide 





The main aim was to devise a procedure, based on 
Freyd' s paradigm, capable of establishing similar memory 
distortions within the auditory domain. This decision was 
guided by the outcome of previous research (Kelly & Freyd, 
1987, Freyd, Kelly & DeKay, 1990) which identified a forward 
memory asymmetry using implied changes in the pitch of a tone. 
That experiment identified a structural similarity between the 
memory distortions noted for pitch changes and those 
previously identified using visual stimuli. In order to 
further investigate memory for sound, it was planned instead 
to focus on the movement of a sound progressing in a linear 
fashion. This was thought to replicate the earlier visual 
experiments more closely because a change in location was 
again specified. This change was predicted to induce memory 
distortions consistent with the visual findings, since in our 
natural surroundings, the movement of a sound is commonly tied 
in to a moving object. 
Since apparatus capable of driving only six speakers 
was initially available for use in this research, a method 
based on Freyd ( 1984) , was followed. In that study, the 
standard inducing sequence consisted of three static displays, 
and the memory shift was determined by simply comparing 
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differences in response time and accuracy for forward and 
backward distracter positions. 
In order to avoid the perception of continuous motion, 
it was planned to relay a tone of the same pitch, to separate 
equally spaced speakers, at regular temporal intervals. If 
these speakers were shielded from the subject's view, it was 
hoped the display would be realistic enough to induce the 
belief that a sounding object was moving along behind the 
screen. In order to test for memory distortions associated 
with the implied sound movement, it was proposed to place 
identical speakers, an equal distance apart, on each side of 
the one delivering the to-be-remembered tone in each sequence. 
Subjects would then be required to make a "same/different" 
judgement based on their memory for the location of the final 
tone. 
It was predicted that subjects would find a forwardly 
placed probe speaker more difficult to reject than a 
backwardly placed one (thus error rate and reaction times 
would be significantly higher in the former case) because a 
forwardly displaced speaker would represent a position that is 
closest to the "remembered" location. In order to demonstrate 
that the memory distortion relies on the consistency of the 
inducing sequence, it was predicted that when the presentation 
order of the inducing tones was permuted, the distortions 
would no longer be apparent. These hypothesised results are 
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Figure 4: Hypothetical results of Experiment 1 displaying error rate as a function of 
probe position and sequence coherence. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Five female and five male unpaid volunteers 
participated in this experiment. All were under-graduate 
students from the University of Canterbury.· Four had a 
background in Psychology, but all were naive to the 
experimental hypothesis. They were aged between 19-34 years 
(mean age 23yrs), and none had participated in pilot studies 
associated with the experiment. 
Apparatus 
The required apparatus was set up in a dimly lit room 
(6.7m x 4.7m) which was well isolated from outside sounds. A 
Superlux desk lamp with a 40 watt bulb, was placed on the 
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desktop about 2 metres away from the subject, and provided the 
only illumination. 
Four corresponding speakers 10cm in diameter, were 
suspended by wire from the ceiling to eliminate differential 
resonance effects from supporting surfaces. These were placed 
at the approximate head height of a seated subject, with each 
speaker arranged ~n linear f~shion, with a centre to centre 
separation of 1 cietre. The third speaker (in a Right to Left 
sequence) was placed 1. 2 metres directly in front of the 
subject. 
Two additional matching speakers were positioned at 
head height, at centre to centre distances 15 ems each side of 
the third speaker. These latter speakers provided the probe 
sounds in the experiment. (refer Fig.2). Pilot studies had 
suggested wide differences in the ability of subjects to 
remember the location of the final tone in a sequence. The 
particular probe locations were chosen because, at this 
spatial separation, the task appeared neither impossibly 
difficult nor trivially easy. 
A thin black curtain was draped from ceiling to floor, 
concealing the entire display from the subject's view, and 
providing a constant background, devoid of identifying 
features which could convey locational cues to the subject. 
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Figure 5 : 
A set of three'morse keys, mounted in a semi-circular 
fashion on a wooden board, was positioned on the bench in 
· front of the subject's seat. 
medium for the experiment. 
This provided the response 
Pilot studies revealed that 
subjects found Freyd's (1984) two key "same-different" 
procedure awkward, because probes, perceived to be on one side 
of the final inducing tone, often called for a response by the 
contralateral hand. The current array proved to be in spatial 
accord with the subjects perception, irrespective of sound 
direction or probe location, thus affording a more compatible 
system of response mapping. 
The entire experiment was controlled by an APPLE II+ 
Computer which was placed out of view of the subject. This 
generated the tones via an assembly language routine which 
toggled one of the four games paddle annunciator outputs, the 
cassette output, or the onboard speaker, at the desired rate 
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and for the required duration. The output from each of these 
was directed to a separate National LM383 semiconductor 
amplifier, which in turn fed through a variable resistor to a 
speaker. Tone wave form and frequency was verified by 
oscilloscope and a Trio DF-7 60 frequency counter. The 
computer also recorded the outcome of each key press response 
in relation to sequence direction, and measured response 
latencies to 1 msec accuracy via a further assembly language 
routine. A small foot pedal, placed beside the subject's 
seat, permitted subject initiation of each block of trials. 
STIMULI 
The inducing sequences consisted of 880 Hz square wave 
tones, with probe tones for each trial being selected at 
random from a frequency range between 400 and 700 Hz. The 
probe tones differed in frequency from the inducing tones, so 
that their difference from the inducing sequence became 
obvious. Also, pilot studies had revealed that when probe and 
inducing tones were of the same frequency, some subjects were 
able to use subtle timbre differences between the outer probes 
and the final inducing tone, as a basis for their location 
responses. The task of course 
solely on locational difference. 
called for responses based 
Making the tones from all 
three probe locations different by altering their frequency, 
forced all subjects to respond to locational differences. 
All speaker locations (including probe speakers) were set 
at a loudness level of 50 dBA (at 800 Hz) using a Bruel & 
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Kjaer (Type 2235) Precision Sound Level Meter. This 
measurement was taken at subject head position so that the 
tones in the inducing sequence were equal in loudness and 
therefore did not increase on approach. This eliminated the 
possibility of any memory distortions arising simply from 
changing levels of loudness. 
The onset duration of each tone (inducing and probe) was 
set at 200 msec. For the tones in the inducing sequence, this 
was followed by an off-set period of 100 msec. Probe tones 
followed the final inducing tone after a 500 msec offset 
interval. 
The inducing tones all began to the subject's right, with 
the final tone in the sequence stopping immediately in front 
of the subject. The limited availability of equipment 
precluded the possibility of systematically varying sequence 
endpoints, or of investigating directional influences using 
the same group of subjects. While Freyd (1984) successfully 
demonstrated her memory displacement effects using a single 
endpoint, pilot work with the present study identified this as 
a problem. It became evident that subjects did not always 
concentrate on the entire sequence as requested, but instead 
attended to only the final location. . To overcome this 
problem, distracter sequences with varying starting and 
finishing positions, were introduced. These were included 
only to create some unpredictability and they were not used in 
the data analysis. 
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EXPERIMENT AL DESIGN 
Six blocks of trials were presented in total, the first 
three of which were treated as practice. The first block 
(Demonstration Block) consisted of only six trials which were 
designed expressly as a brief introduction to the equipment 
and the general procedure. The sequences in this block used 
all the four inducing speakers as starting positions, and the 
presentation order remained the same for each subject. 
However, the trials in this block were composed of quite 
different sequences to those contained in the main 
experimental blocks (refer Appendix B, Table 1), and the 
temporal interval between the tones was doubled. This 
effectively halved the presentation rate so that subjects had 
extra time to comprehend task requirements. Each subject was 
required to make two "Left", two "Same" and two "Right" 
judgements at this stage, thus bringing into play all three 
response keys if each probe was correctly identified. 
Subjects were given accuracy feedback by the experimenter 
after each trial. 
Two further training blocks followed. Each of these 
consisted of 36 trials comprising each of the Experimental and 
Distracter sequences, 
forms. These trials 
presented in coherent and incoherent 
were identical to those used in the 
subsequent experimental blocks but the task at this stage 
differed slightly. Subjects were currently instructed to make 
only a two-way discrimination which required the use of only 
two of the morse keys. Before commencing each block, they 
were informed whether it would involve a "same versus right" 
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judgement (Right Pr act ice) or conversely, a discrimination 
between "same and left" (Left Practice) Each of these 
practice blocks contained twice as many "backward" (or 
"forward") as "same" trials, so that over the two blocks the 
three responses were equally probable. (See Appendix B, 
Tables 2 & 3) . The starting order of each of these two 
practice blocks was counterbal-anced across subjects. 
The main aim of these blocks was to ensure subjects 
became proficient at making the judgements and registering the 
decision, as quickly and as accurately as possible. It must 
however be stressed, that feedback, relating either to 
accuracy or to the ability to follow task requirements, was 
NOT provided at this time, nor at any future stage of data 
collection. Instead, a few words of general encouragement 
which were independent of the pattern of responding, were 
relayed to each subject at the conclusion of every block of 
trials. 
The experimental hypothesis was in relation to the 
inducing sequences and responses presented in the subsequent 
three blocks of trials. Each of these blocks was made up of 
48 trials, consisting of 12 conditions, which represented an 
equal balance across Probe Position (i.e. Backward, Same, 
Forward) ; Sequence Type (Coherent, Incoherent) ; Required 
Key-Press Response (Right, Middle, Left); and Direction of 
Movement (Left, Right) see Appendix B, Table 4. The 
sequences of greatest interest were those relating to speaker 
positions 1 ... 2 ... 4 (Experimental Coherent Sequences) which 
were probed with speakers 3, 4 and 5. These sequences all 
began to the right of the subject, and finished directly in 
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front of them. (Refer to Fig .1) However, as there was a 
need to create some degree of uncertainty (as mentioned 
previously), Distracter Sequences, following the same balanced 
format as previously outlined, but using different speaker and 
probe positions (6 ... 4 ... 2 with probes at 3, 2 & 1) were also 
included. 
Incoherent sequences, involving a permutation of each of 
the two previous presentations, were also included. These 
were intended to induce no forward memory distortions since a 
consistent patterns of movement was no longer implied. Each 
block of 48 trials in the experimental stage, consisted of six 
repetitions of the experimental sequences 





sequences (coherent & incoherent). A different random order 
of trials within each block was determined by the computer for 
each subject. 
There were also three types of responses each subject 
could make. These were based solely on a judgement of the 
location of the fourth tone. In 1/3 of the trials, this tone 
sounded from the same speaker as the final inducing tone. For 
the remaining trials, this fourth tone was displaced either 
somewhere to the right or to the left of the last tone in the 
sequence. These displacements were represented with equal 
probability. 
The task now required a high level of concentration since 
the starting and finishing points varied between trials, the 
tonal direction changed unpredictably, and the subject was 
required to make a difficult discrimination. 
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PROCEDURE 
Subjects were tested individually in a session lasting 
approximately 45 minutes. The nature of the task and the 
procedural requirements were explained orally by the 
experimenter, who followed a standardized format set out on a 
written instruction sheet (refer Appendix A - Handout 2) A 
signed consent to participate was also obtained from each 
subject (see Appendix A - Handout 1, for an example of this 
form) . 
The task was such that each subject was required to 
listen to a sequence· of three brief inducing tones, and to 
remember the location of the third sound in the sequence. 
They indicated the remembered position of this final tone, by 
reporting whether an ensuing probe tone of a differing pitch, 
had sounded from the same location, or whether it was 
displaced to the left or to the right. To do so, they were 
instructed to place the index finger of their preferred hand 
gently on the centre key in front of them. Subjects were 
informed that they were to press the centre key if the final 
tone in the sequence and the probe tone sounded from exactly 
the same location. If they thought the probe was to the~ 
of the final tone they were to use the key to the left, and 
similarly, the right key for probes perceived to be to the 
right. They were told to expect 1/3 of the probe trials to 
come from the same place as the last tone in the inducing 
sequence, with the remaining trials being equally displaced 
somewhere to the left or right. This distribution therefore 
called for an equivalent number of responses at each morse 
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key, should a subject correctly identify all the probes. At 
all times accuracy of responding was stressed over speed. 
Each block of trials began with a verbal request for the 
subject to place goggles over their eyes, assume the required 
position on the rear of their seat, and prepare to focus their 
gaze directly in front of them. The need for eye goggles was 
recognised when pilot data - indicated tht subjects will 
visually search for any available "landmark" to aid 
localization. 
A firm reminder to refrain from making any head or eye 
movements during each sequence was also relayed to each 
subject. If this factor was not controlled, subjects may 
physically "track" the sound, and be unable to stop the eyes 
or head from moving after the sequence had ended. A head 
position which remained relatively constant throughout each 
trial was also deemed to be a necessary factor (approximately 
0° azimuth and 0° elevation), to allow subjects to make 
accurate and comparable judgements across the two critical 
probe locations. Finally, subjects were informed of the 
importance of concentrating on the progression of the entire 
sequence of sounds during each trial. This instruction was 
given to minimize the possibility of subjects mentally 
"fixating" on a particular spatial position, and subsequently 
using this as an anchor for a locational judgement based on 
only the final tone in the sequence. 
Subjects were next requested to position the index finger 
of their preferred hand gently on top of the centre response 
key, and to press the foot pedal to initiate each of the 
designated blocks of trials, whenever they were ready to 
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begin. Once the foot pedal was pressed, a 1 second delay 
followed before the first tonal sequence began. Ensuing 
trials began automatically 1 second after subject's key press 
responses. This pattern repeated without further commentary 
until the designated number of trials in each block was 
completed. Should a subject press a response key before 
either a sequence had finished or the probe tone had sounded, 
the trial was deleted and re-introduced later within the same 
block. 
At the completion of each block of trials, subjects were 
invited to remove the goggles and relax for a few minutes. 
During this time, response data were displayed on the computer 
screen, for the experimenter to view out of sight of the 
subject. After a suitable rest period the next trial block 
was presented. 
When the experimental session concluded, each subject was 
thoroughly de-briefed in regard to the hypothesis and the 
expected 
subjects 
results. An opportunity 
to discuss their pattern 
was also provided for 
of responding with the 
researcher, if they should wish to do so. 
RESULTS 
All subjects reported the subjective experience of 
hearing~ sound or sounding object moving along in front of 
them behind the screen. While eye and head movements could 
not be monitored, all subjects reported that they felt no 
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tendency to move their heads or eyes since the duration of 
each tonal sequence was so brief. 
It will be recalled that subjects were presented with the 
possibility of making two types of error at each probe point. 
A tone from a backward probe could be mistakenly identified as 
being in the same place or maybe forward of the location they 
had been requested to remember. Similarly, a forwardly 
displaced probe tone could be mis-interpreted as having 
sounded from the same place as the third tone or perhaps 
backward of it. Finally a probe tone sounding from the 
identical speaker to that of the to-be remembered tone, may be 
judged either forward or backward of that position. The raw 
data pertaining to these responses for each of the ten 
subjects, is presented in Appendix C, Table 1 while the table 






Percentage distribution of total responses recorded 
by subjects (N=lO) at each probe point within the 
experimental sequences. 
BACKWARD PROBE SAME PROBE FORWARD PROBE 
Bwd Same Fwd Bwd Same Fwd Bwd Same Fwd 
70. 6 23.9 5.5 25.6 60.5 13.9 10 46.1 43.9 
63.9 31.1 5.0 23.3 61. 1 15.6 7.8 49.4 42.8 
Table 1 identifies the response choices favoured by 
subjects by presenting their total key-press responses as a 
percentage of the number of trials (n=180) at each probe 
point. The figures in italics identify the percentage of 
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correct responses within each category. 
subjects were noticeably less accurate 
As predicted, 
in correctly 
identifying the forwardly displaced probe tone compared to the 
equally displaced backward probe. Subject's judgements also 
displayed a decreasing level of accuracy in the direction of 
the implied movement, according to the hypothesis. 
When percentage errors are viewed in terms of a 
comparison bet ween "same" responses at each probe point, the 
strategy employed by Freyd & Finke (1984), the contrast 
between the outer two probe points becomes more distinct (see 
Fig.6). It is observed that the forwardly displaced probe 
tone within the coherent sequences, was identified as being at 
the same location as the final tone in the sequence on 46.1% 
of the trials. This compares with the 23.95% of backward 
trials for which the same error occurred. A paired t-test on 
each subjects 11 same II responses across these two categories, 
identified this difference as being statistically significant 













Figure 6: Percentage of "Same" responses as a function of probe position and sequence type. 
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While error rates were much higher than those found in 
similar visual experiments, the overall level of accuracy was 
still shown to be very satisfactory. Since subjects were 
given the opportunity to respond in one of three ways to each 
probe tone (i.e. backward, same or forward), they had a 1 in 3 
chance of guessing the correct response. To assess this 
possibility, the mean number of correct responses per subject 
was found for each probe point. This was compared to a level 
indicative of chance responding (i.e. 6 correct 
identifications at each probe) using one sample t-tests. 
These revealed that the overall accuracy was significantly 
greater than chance for both the backward probe 
p <0. 001, 1-tailed) and the centre probe (t 
( t ( 9) =4 . 5 6, 
(9) =4.77, p 
<0. 001, 1-tailed) . Subject responses at the forward speaker 
location however did not differ significantly from chance. 
While the predicted effects were noted for error data 
within the coherent sequences, no significant patterns emerged 
when subject response times were compared. The mean reaction 
time (RT) for correctly identifying the probe speaker placed 
slightly forward of the "true position" should have been 
markedly slower than the speaker placed an equal distance 
backward. Yet, the opposite trend was noted, with the mean 
time for a correct identification of the backward condition 
being 941.17 msecs, which was slightly slower than the average 
922.76 msec it took subjects to accurately record a response 
in the forward condition. This was not seen to be a problem 
for the hypothesis because it is now accepted that measures 
based on reaction times can be unreliable (Finke et al, 1985) 
since subjects can make an insufficient number of responses 
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within a condition to calculate a reliable reaction time. 
This was particularly evident in the present study, with some 
individuals making a correct response on as few as 6% of 
trials. 
However, the most obvious feature of the results is the 
observation that in opposition to the original prediction, the 
incoherent sequences also produced a pattern of responses 
consistent with a motion induced memory displacement. Table 1 
clearly shows just how similar the level of responding was 
across these two sequence types, with error rates (i.e. 
percentage of "same" responses) between backward and forward 
probes still being very different. However, application of a 
t-test to subject frequency of "same" responses just failed to 
reach significance, (t (9) =-1.74, p <0.058, 1-tailed). 
In accord with results for the coherent sequences, one-
sample t-tests revealed the mean number of correct responses 
to exceed chance for backward probes t (9) =4.53, p <0.001, 
and centre probes t (9) = 3.98, p <,01, but not for forward 
probes t (9) = 1.116, p = 1.46 n.s. 
DISCUSSION 
As the localisation judgements in this experiment are 
believed to be based primarily on interaural temporal 
differences which are assumed to dominate at lower frequencies 
(Yost & Neilson, 1985), and the probe speakers were placed at 
an equal angular distance from the central point of the 
subject's head, there should be no difference in the level of 
accuracy between these speakers. The results however clearly 
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show that, on average, subjects found it considerably more 
difficult to reject a forwardly placed "probe" compared to a 
correspondingly positioned backward one. Since this 
difficulty arose with the speaker placed forward of the to-be 
remembered location, and in the direction of the movement, it 
would seem that this response asymmetry could only be 
interpreted as providing furthBr evidence for a motion induced 
forward memory displacement effect. 
Perhaps most significantly though, the present findings 
have failed to show a difference between the coherent and 
incoherent sequences, with memory distortions consistent with 
momentum predictions, being obtained for both sequence types. 
This seems to seriously question the validity of a conclusion 
for a motion induced memory effect, since Freyd & Finke (1984) 
used the lack of coherence as a control condition in their 
original study. While this finding would appear to 
immediately negate the hypothesis, it could be argued that a 
tone being relayed in a speaker order of 2 ... 1 ... 4 (refer 
Fig.5) could still create a forward memory displacement based 
on the interpretation of a rapid Right-Left movement between 
the second pair in the sequence. In fact, this explanation is 
compatible with the research findings of Freyd & Johnson, 
1987. In a control condition, using an incoherent sequence of 
rectangular orientations, it was shown that by varying the 
inter-stimulus intervals between the first and second, and 
second and third rectangle positions, while holding stimulus 
durations constant, a positive memory shift can still be 
obtained (Exp. 4) . These researchers contend that this 
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momentum effect was obtained from only the last two stimuli 
presented. 
Similarly, while the incoherent sequences in the present 
study may appear to be neither systematic nor predictable, it 
will be recalled that they, like the coherent sequences, all 
commenced to the right of the subject, with the final tone 
stopping immediately in front.- It is therefore quite feasible 
to contend that subjects learned to anticipate the sound 
trajectory on the basis of the starting position of the 
sequence. It is perhaps significant that no remarks were made 
about the confusing nature of sequences from the right, 
whereas the distracter sequences, which began either to the 
left of subject or directly in front of them, prompted many 
comments. 
Although the experiment produced the expected patterns of 
results in terms of a difference in memory between the two 
outer probe speakers, there is the possibility that this could 
be explained in terms of factors that are independent of the 
temporal order of the tones, or the spatial positioning of the 
speakers. A major concern would be a slight, but detectable 
difference in the timbre of one of the probe speakers. This 
could be caused by a slight dissimilarity between the speakers 
or some variation in the acoustical properties of the room. 
This could create the situation whereby sounds from one 
speaker may be more distinctive than sounds from the other, 
(even though probe pitch varied from trial to trial), with the 
consequence that one 
distinguish. It is 
speaker may have been much easier to 
very important to rule out such an 
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explanation for the effect, therefore the following experiment 
is aimed at specifically addressing this concern. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
INTRODUCTION 
If the noted differences in error rates in Experiment 1 
were solely attributable to an inherent characteristic of one 
of the probe speakers, this factor should become apparent if 
the function of each probe speaker is reversed by changing the 
direction of the main experimental sequence. While it is 
acknowledged that the influence of speaker acuity and sound 
direction would have been addressed most adequately by 
incorporating these variables into the original design, such 
an option was not possible due to limited availability of 
equipment. Instead it was proposed to address these concerns 
by altering the locations of the main speakers to accommodate 
a change in direction, and repeating the experimental 
procedure with a new group of subjects. The prediction of 
course being, that the pattern of results obtained will again 
reflect the direct ion of the mot ion. If so, the probe 
location producing low errors in Experiment 1 should be 





Ten subjects also participated in this experiment. All 





They ranged in age from 20 - 31 years (mean age= 
Each subject was naive to the hypothesis in 
The apparatus was identical to that used for Experiment 1 
except that the three main speakers used in the inducing stage 
were rearranged to accommodate the sound sequence coming from 
the opposite direction. To achieve this, Speaker No.1 (refer 
Fig.5) was moved to a position two metres to the left of the 
seated subject, and Speakers 2 & 6 were exchanged. The 
"probe" Speakers, plus Speaker 4, which delivered the final 
tone in the sequence in the first experiment, remained in 
exactly the same places as before, In effect then, all the 
locations were represented by the same speakers as in the 
previous experiment, except that now, the outer probes served 
the opposite function. It is important to note that loudness 
levels of the speakers remained equal at subject head 
position, and that neither the positions nor loudness levels 
of the three probe speakers were altered from Experiment 1. 
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STIMULI AND PROCEDURE 
The stimuli used in this experiment, and the procedure 
followed, corresponded to those of Experiment 1, except that 
the main experimental sequences now moved from the left of the 
subject to their right, and the distracter sequences also 
represented a change in direction. This had the effect of 
reversing the order of the conditions relating to the two 
probe speakers (i.e. Backward and Forward) as well as 
reversing the key press responses required to correctly 
identify these probe positions. 
RESULTS 
Again the raw data pertaining to the responses made by 
each subject are presented in Appendix C Table 2, while the 
percentage distribution of responses registered by all the 
subjects at each probe location, 
below. An unexpected finding 
difference in the probe speakers 
direction to that hypothesised. 
in Table 2 are displayed 





experiment, subjects now showed a tendency towards identifying 
the backward probe tone as representing the location of the 
tone they had been requested to remember. A paired t-test, 
assessing the number of II same II responses registered by 
subjects at these two probe points within each coherent 







Percentage distribution of the total responses 
made by subjects (N=l0), at each of the three 
probe locations. 
BACKWARD PROBE SAME PROBE FORWARD PROBE 
Bwd Same Fwd Bwd Same Fwd Bwd Same Fwd 
35 49.4 15.6 11. 7 56. 1 32.3 10 37.2 58.8 
28.3 52.8 18.9 10.6 59.4 30 4 35.6 60 
This tends to suggest that subjects found it equally 
difficult to make a correct· identification of either outer 
., 
probe speaker. However further statistical analyses revealed 
that the level of accuracy at the forward probe, unlike that 
of the backwardly placed speaker, was significantly better 
than would be expected to occur by chance alone (t (9) = 3.96, 
p < 0.01, 1-tailed) . Similarly, subjects judgements 
registered in relation to the central probe site were also 
regarded as being reasonably accurate (t (9) = 3.01, p < 0.01, 
1-tailed). 
Like the first experiment, a change in the order of the 
tonal presentation within a sequence, proved to be of no 
noticeable consequence. Both coherent and incoherent 
sequences produced a pattern of results which statistical 
analyses indicated were very similar. 
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DISCUSSION 
The results from the current study do not provide 
evidence in support of the hypothesis, and, by failing to do 
so, they represent a complete contrast to the assumptions 
posited in Experiment 1. It would now seem that the response 
asymmetry of the earlier study·, which was then attributed to a 
mandatory anticipation effect, may in essence, have been 
created by the non-equivalence of the two probe speakers. 
This would appear to be the inevitable conclusion based on the 
findings which suggest that when the functions of the probe 
speakers are reversed (without a change in position), there is 
no corresponding change in the proportion of errors made at 
these locations. 
It may still be possible though that an another factor 
has contributed to the incompatibility of the results. An 
interesting observation is the imbalance in the number of key 
press responses within the experimental phase. This appears 
to be independent of key function or sound direction. It will 
be recalled, that in both experiments there was an equal 
probability of the probe tone presenting at each of the three 
locations, thereby creating the situation where each response 
key would be pressed equally often if subjects were completely 
accurate. The total key press responses registered by 
subjects throughout the experimental sequences of both studies 
are presented graphically in Figure 7. These indicate a clear 
difference in responses registered at each morse key, with 
subjects displaying a marked preference for the central 
response key. It was of course the case that each subject had 
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their index finger poised to respond at the central key, which 
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Figure 7: Total number of responses registered as a function of key position and 
experimental procedure. 
The two outer morse keys differed in the total number of 
responses they attracted (t (19) = 6.09, p < 0.002, 2-tailed), 
with the left key attracting the least attention. This left 
key corresponded to Probe Speaker 5, which acted both as a 
11 forward probe II in the first experiment, and a 11 backward 
probe" in the subsequent study. This probe position produced 
very high error rates in both experiments. Of course it is 
not possible to determine whether a response bias has 
contributed to the unexpected findings or whether one of the 
outer probe speakers had a uniquely characteristic sound. 
Constraints caused by the availability of only six 
speakers in the present study, resulted in procedures likely 
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to be insensitive detectors of movement induced memory 
displacement. The inducing sequences were short, the spatial 
separation between speakers was perhaps excessive, and a 
common endpoint directly in front of the subject, occurred on 
all trials. It is evident that an alternative procedure, less 
biased against the demonstration of the memory displacement 
effect, is needed. Further studies, incorporating a 





In the pr~sent context, the more direct method used by 
Hubbard & Bharucha ( 1988) had appeal. These researchers 
successfully used an apparent motion paradigm to demonstrate a 
similar memory displacement effect to that identified by Freyd 
and colleagues. Their subjects followed a small dot which was 
observed to move in a linear fashion across a computer screen. 
This dot was then shown to disappear at one of five pre-
arranged positions. The subject's task was simply to position 
a hair-line cross over the vanishing point of the dot. They 
were shown to misplace the cross in the direction of movement 
with the degree of this displacement increasing with dot 
velocity. 
In the current study, subjects tracked a sounding object 
which was hidden from view, and they indicated the ''vanishing 
point" of the sound by directing the beam of a laser pointer 
to the location. The prediction is, that the judged vanishing 
point of the tone will be displaced forward of the true 




Fifteen unpaid volunteers participated in this 
experiment. All were first year Psychology students from the 
University of Canterbury. The 4 male and 11 females were aged 
between 18 - 32 years, with a mean age of 21 years. All 
indicated they were right-handed. 
APPARATUS AND STIMULI 
Thirty one, 10 cm diameter AXENT speakers (model 10G45P) 
were adjacently mounted on the lower edge of a 3. 5 metre 
13x2cm wooden plank which was suspended from the ceiling. The 
entire display, which extended almost the length of the 3.7 x 
3.5 metre room, was positioned at the approximate head height 
of a seated subject. Black cotton curtaining was draped from 
ceiling to floor to conceal the speakers from view, and to 
provide a uniform background as devoid of landmarks and visual 
anchors as possible. 
A 2.5cm square black aluminium rod spanning the entire 
display, was mounted in timber supports each side of the room, 
and positioned directly in front of the curtain. A measuring 
scale consisting of 1 centimetre demarcations, with 
identifying numerals every 5cms, was drawn on one side of the 
bar. This enabled accurate identification of the location of 
the pointer beam, and hence the remembered vanishing point of 
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the sounding object. Subjects indicated the vanishing point 
by pointing the beam of a PLUS laser pointer (Model LP-010) at 
a blank side of the black rod. The experimenter then 
activated an electric motor which rotated the rod, bringing 
the measuring scale into view. After entering the numerically 
coded location into the controlling Apple II+ computer, the 
rod was again rotated to expose a blank side in preparation 
for the next trial. 
Purpose built circuitry was constructed for the 
experiment. This allowed a sequence of brief sounds to be 
generated, beginning either at the extreme left or extreme 
right speaker. These sounds could be relayed inwards from 
speaker to speaker in either direction, for a predetermined 
number of speakers. The duration of each sound, and the 
silent interval between the sounds from successive speakers, 
was determined to within millisecond accuracy by an Apple II+ 
computer, using its onboard oscillator and assembly language 
software. The tones were produced by a tone generator, 
external to the computer. An oscilloscope display revealed 
the sounds to be a basic 400 Hz square wave tone with a 
superimposed onset click. The resultant sound was somewhat 
similar to the bells heard at a railway level-crossing. 
The loudness level of each speaker was adjusted to 57dB, 
using a Bruel & Kjaer (Type 2235) Precision Sound Level Meter. 
Measures were taken with the instrument placed at subject head 
height, 1 metre directly in front of each speaker. Unlike the 
previous experiment, the aim was to equate the energy output 
of each speaker, not to equate their loudness at the location 
of the subject. The sounds now showed a slight, yet 
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discernable, increase in loudness as they progressed towards 
the subject. It was not possible, within cost constraints, to 
obtain variable resistors with sufficient range, to permit the 
equation of loudness levels of the 31 speakers at the position 
of the subject. 
The sound sequences were programmed to begin from either 
end of the linear arrangement; with each speaker regulated to 
sound a tone for 100 msec. This was followed by an off-period 
of 10 msec, after which time the next adjacent speaker 
sounded. This represented a sound travelling at the 
approximate rate of 1 metre per second. Pilot studies 
suggested this particular stimulus onset asynchrony provided a 
realistic impression of a sounding object progressing in a 
consistent manner behind the screen. Selecting the optimal 
speed for the sound required careful consideration. If the 
sounds progressed too slowly it became possible to count the 
number of sounds in the sequence and this could be used as a 
basis for the localization judgement each time, whereas on the 
other hand, if the sounds moved too quickly they could not be 
tracked. 
The experiment was conducted in a dimly lit room, with 
the only illumination being provided by the 22 watt 
fluorescent MAGGYLAMP positioned next to the experimenter. 
Stimuli were presented in 33 trial blocks, with all the 
stimuli in a block representing motion in one direction. The 
motion stopped at one of 11 termination points, with each 
location point being probed 3 times in the 33 trial block. 
Within each block, the stopping· positions were· determined 
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randomly, with a different random order being used for each 
block and each subject. 
For the purpose of identification, each speaker was 
imagined to be numbered inwards from speaker 1 at each end 
(left or right). For each direction, stopping locations of 14 
- 24 inclusive, were used. The subject sat directly in front 
of speaker 19 (which was - midway between the stopping 
locations) on a 66cm high chair, placed 2 metres in front of 
the line of speakers. It will be noted that subjects were not 
seated in the middle of the 31 speaker array. Instead, their 
position was determined by the direction of the motion, with a 
change in direction involving a re-positioning of the chair to 
allow a minimum sequence of 14 speakers to sound on any one 
trial. It was hoped that the longer sound sequences would 
serve to enhance the implications of motion, 




A foot pedal, positioned at the base of the subject's 
chair, enabled subjects to initiate their own trials. 
PROCEDURE 
The experiment consisted of four blocks of 33 trials, each 
preceded by a short practice block consisting of 11 trials. 
These practice blocks probed each of the end positions due to 
appear in the forthcoming block, and the same random ordering 
of these practice trials was presented to each subject. The 
experimental blocks were paired according to sound direction, 
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with half the subjects completing two blocks with left to 
right movement before right to left. Each block was separated 
by a short recess. 
The experimental session began with each subject having 
the task explained to them by way of a standardized 
instruction sheet (refer Appendix A - Handout 3). They were 
asked to follow the wording while the information was being 
conveyed orally by the experimenter. Subjects were informed 
that on each trial they would be aware of a sound moving 
either from left to right or right to left, behind the black 
curtaining in front of them. The starting position of the 
tone would be predetermined before each block began, and the 
direction would remain constant throughout a complete block of 
33 trials. They were instructed to concentrate very carefully 
on the progression of this sound and try and locate the exact 
position at which the last sound occurred. The need for 
accuracy was stressed. 
Each trial was initiated by the subject depressing the 
foot pedal placed next to them. After a 1 second delay, the 
first sound sequence commenced. Prior to this, the subject 
had been requested to focus their eyes on a small white cross 
painted on the black bar directly in front of them. The 
instruction being, that they were not to move their head or 
eyes during each trial until the sound ceased. This was in 
direct response to findings in the pilot studies, which 
indicated that the uncontrolled movement of the head or eyes 
appeared to inhibit the accuracy of the localization 
judgements. In these situations, the sound sequence appeared 
to be progressing at a rate faster than eye or head movements 
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could monitor. Consequently, this created an identifiable 
"memory lag" effect, since many subjects were noted to 
conclude that the sound had terminated at a point noticeably 
backward of the true position. Such an effect was not in 
evidence when a fixation point was incorporated into the 
procedure. 
Once the sound stopped~ subjects were instructed to 
respond immediately, and identify the location at which they 
last heard the sound. This was achieved simply by pressing a 
button on the laser pointer held in their right hand, and 
directing a small beam of light onto the black bar positioned 
in front of the curtain. The experimenter then activated an 
electric motor which rotated the aluminium bar to reveal the 
measuring instrument on the reverse side. The identified 
position was recorded onto a numeric key pad, from where it 
was registered by the computer. As an accuracy check, the 
entry was displayed on the computer screen for the 
experimenter to view, and the subsequent trial could not begin 
until this information was deemed correct by pressing the 
"Enter" key. 
Subjects were also informed of the importance of re-
focusing not only their eyes, but al so their complete 
attention back to the centre point after the completion of 
each trial. This was to prevent their response judgements 
being influenced by the finishing point of the previous trial. 
The instruction was also given, that should a subject discover 
their performance on any one trial to be impaired due to 
distractions or inattention, they must inform the experimenter 
of this fact immediately. It was explained to them that 
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failure to do so, would seriously affect the overall accuracy 
of their results. Since the facility to re-schedule a trial 
was not provided in the software, any such trials were simply 
deleted. 
After each experimental block there was a short recess to 
provide subjects with a few minutes break from the task, and 
to enable the experimenter - to re-position the chair to 
accommodate a change in sound direction when the need arose. 
Each block of trials took approximately 10 minutes for 
subjects to complete, and the entire session was comfortably 
completed in just under one hour. At the conclusion of each 
session, subjects were thoroughly de-briefed with regard to 
the hypothesis and expected results. Arrangements were also 
made for each subject to collect a full written summary of 
their results plus the overall pattern of findings, at a pre-
determined future time. It is important to note, that up 
until the completion of all the experimental blocks, no 
feedback was given to any subject with regard to their 
performance. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
While each subject was provided with the opportunity to 
reject trials on which they felt their ability to locate the 
sound accurately had been compromised, only three chose to do 
so. In these cases a maximum of two trials were eliminated, 
and these were distributed across probe points. The data from 
one male subject were excluded from the analysis after initial 
concerns about his ability to attend to the task, were 
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substantiated when mean average deviations at each of the 
probe points were noted to be unacceptably high. Subjects 
also reported no tendency to move their eyes from the fixation 
point. Head movements were monitored at random by the 
experimenter. No such movements were observed. (Refer 
Appendix C, Table 7 for analysis of Variance Summary Table. 
Note the conservative degrees ?f freedom used.) 
For each sound sequence, the perceived vanishing point 
was expressed as a deviation from the actual vanishing point; 
with positive deviations indicating the vanishing point to be 
perceived to the right of its true position. Conversely, 
negative deviations signalled a displacement to the left 
(refer Appendix C, Tables 3 & 4 for subjects raw data). 
Figure 8, presents the mean displacements (reported in 
ems) as a function of both the direction of apparent motion, 
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Figure 8: Experiment 3~ mean deviations at each speaker position as a function 
of sound direction. 
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It will be recalled, subjects were repositioned depending upon 
direct ion of mot ion, to allow longer inducing sequences. 
Consequently, each speaker location indicated on the 
horizontal axis in Figure 8, actually refers to two separate 
speakers at different absolute locations. These speakers are 
thought to be at corresponding positions, relative to the 
subject. 
On the graph, the points above zero indicate mean 
displacements to the right of their true location, while 
points below this line, specify displacements to the left. It 
will be noted that, regardless of direction of movement, 
vanishing points on either side of the subject were perceived 
to be displaced inwards (i.e. towards the subject) . This 
tendency towards an inward displacement of the vanishing point 
is noticeably greater at outer probe sites. However, since a 
fixation cross was used to cohtrol eye and head movements, the 
judged displacement of vanishing points closest to the central 
position would be expected to be less, purely on the basis of 
improved localization directly in front of the subject. 
If vanishing point eccentricity was the only factor that 
was operating, it is expected that the points in Figure 8 
would be very similar across directions. This clearly is not 
the case. For the most part, displacements for Left-Right 
movement were displaced further to the right in relation to 
subjects location, than were corresponding displacements 
occurring when the sound moved in the opposite direction. 
This of course is the pattern one would expect, if the 
remembered vanishing points were displaced in the direction of 
the implied motion as predicted. 
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In order to evaluate the overall effect of speaker 
position and sound direction, subjects mean deviations at each 
probe location were treated by a within subjects, direction x 
location analysis of variance. While no main effect for sound 
direction was apparent, the location of the probe speakers, F 
(3, 42) = 60.064, p < .0001; and the interaction between 
speaker location and sound dfrection F (5, 62) = 13.346, p < 
.0001, were highly significant. 
The effect of direction of implied motion on subjects' 
ability to localize the vanishing point was further explored 
by comparing the left to right, and right to left deviations 
at each of the 11 relative speaker locations. A student 
t-value was calculated for each comparison and the resultant 
values and associated probabilities are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Student t-values based on a comparison between 
subject's mean deviations at each vanishing 
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Table 3 indicates that the perceived vanishing points 
differ reliably as a function of direction of motion, at the 
centrally located probe sites. It must also be noted that 
while speaker position 11 displayed a significant divergence 
of judgements, these were in fact in the direction opposite to 
that predicted. The speaker position seen to be of greatest 
relevance though, is the one ~ositioned directly in front of 
subject (Position 6) At this point, one would anticipate 
localization accuracy to be at its best, since interaural 
temporal differences are zero. However, subjects, on average, 
judged the vanishing point of the sound to be to the right of 
this speaker for implied Left-Right motion, and to the left of 
it, when the sound moved in the opposite direction. This is 
as predicted by Freyd' s ( 198 4) movement induced memory 
displacement hypothesis. 
While the above results would seem to provide 
considerable evidence in favour of a motion induced memory 
displacement effect, it needs to be remembered that identical 
speakers and the same absolute locations were not compared 
across directions, even though great care was taken to ensure 
that speakers were equivalent in loudness and timbre. The 
current procedures were adopted knowingly in the hope that 
long inducing sequences would maximize the likelihood of 
obtaining the predicted location displacement effects. Since 
the predicted effect was in evidence, it was decided to repeat 
the experiment with the subject seated in the centre of the 31 
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the University of 
female and 7 male 
years. Again, all 
indicated they were right-handed. None of these subjects had 
participated in the earlier research. 
APPARATUS, STIMULI AND PROCEDURE 
The design of the experiment was identical to that of 
Experiment 3, except that subjects were seated directly in 
front of the speaker No.16, located at the mid-point of the 31 
speaker array. 
The inducing sequences were reduced in length by three 
speakers (30 ems) so that the sound was relayed through a 
minimum of 11 speakers before it vanished. 
The procedures followed in this equipment corresponded in 
every way to those of the previous study. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Five subjects chose to eliminate up to two of their 
experimental responses after becoming distracted by extraneous 
sounds. The data rejected, were again shown to be distributed 
evenly across speaker locations. Head movements were 
monitored at random intervals, and none were observed. 
Subjects also reported no tendency to move their eyes from the 
fixation cross. 
Treatment of the data followed that of the previous 
experiment. The raw subject data is displayed in Appendix C, 
Tables 5 & 6, while Figure 5 presents mean displacements as a 
function of direction of motion. It is important to draw 
attention to the fact that identical speakers and the same 
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Figure 9: Experiment 4, mean deviations at each speaker position as a function of 
sound direction. 
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A pattern of results very similar to those of Experiment 
3 is revealed. Again, regardless of the direction of the 
movement, vanishing points were perceived to be displaced 
inwards towards the subject, with this tendency being more 
pronounced for speakers of greater eccentricity. 
Subject mean deviations at each speaker location were 
treated by a direction x location analysis of variance. The 
location main effect F (3, 54) = 39.301, p < .0001 was highly 
significant. While no main effect was observed for direction, 
the interaction between speiker location and sound direction F 
(4, 92) = 9.402, p < .001 was statistically significant. 
To objectively determine the level of divergence of 
responses at each speaker, mean deviation scores from each 
subject were again compared across directions to yield a 
student t-value for each of the 11 speaker locations. Table 4 
presents a summary of the values calculated for each 
comparison. This provides clear statistical evidence to show 
that the absolute locations at which subjects reported to the 
tone to vanish, varied according to direction at the three 
centre speakers. This would seem to provide strong evidence 
in favour of a motion induced memory displacement effect, 




Student t-values based on a comparison between 
subjects' mean deviations at each vanishing 
location, relative to sound direction. 
SPEAKER 
LOCATION t-VALUE PROBABILITY 
1 2.52 .020* 
2 3.01 .007** 
3 1.21 .238 
4 1. 60 .123 
5 2.69 .014* 
6 3.70 .001* 
7 2.18 .040* 
8 0.65 .522 
9 1.98 .061 
•. 10 0.49 .625 
11 3.18 .004** 
* p < .05, 2-tailed 
** p < .0l, 2-tailed 
Interestingly, there are also significant divergent effects 
shown at the outer speaker sites, with Figure q identifying a 
clear "cross-over" effect approximately two speakers each side 
of subject. It is difficult to offer an explanation for these 
effects other than to suggest that the inducing sequences are 
short at these points for one direction and long for the 
other. An alternative explanation is that there may be 
directional differences in attending to sounds, whereby 
subjects show either a right ear or left ear advantage. In 
fact the auditory literature supports such a speculation by 
providing some evidence to suggest a right hemisphere 
advantage (left ear) for the processing of non-verbal sounds. 
(Baddeley, 1976; Schiffman, 1982). If this is in fact the 
case, there may be a slight "attentional lag" before the 
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subject can register the sound. Such a pattern seems suited 
to the data produced in this experiment, however no 
conclusions can be drawn without further experimentation. 
Another striking feature to emerge from the results was 
the clear disparity in judgements for speakers immediately to 
the left and right of the subject (refer Figure 9 ) . It was 
noted for that left to right ·movement, . if the sound vanished 
at the speaker placed to the left of the subject, the judged 
vanishing point was displaced to the right of the vanishing 
point by a significant margin t (13) = 4.325, p < .001, 1-
tailed. Yet, for right to left motion, judgements at this 
same speakerdid not differ signficantly from true vanishing 
point. Similarly, the speaker to the right of subject 
produced deviations which were significantly to the left of 
true vanishing point for right-left movement, t (13) = 2.011, 
p < . 05, 1-tailed, yet deviations were not significantly 
different from zero when the sound appeared to move from left 
to right. A similar pattern to this was noted in Experiment 
3, but no direct comparisons could be made since the actual 
speakers differed. 
As these speakers were placed at an equal angular 
distance to each side of subject's midline, it is to be 
expected that judgements at these sites would be similar. 
However, the pattern of results quite clearly shows that 
subjects were able to locate the stopping position of the 
sound with good accuracy on the occasions where the sound was 
perceived as having just passed the body midline. The 
conclusions one can draw from this are not clear cut. It may 
well be, that a cognitive influence has infiltrated the 
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hypothesised extrapolation tendency. If this were the case it 
would clearly deviate from Freyds claim (Finke & Freyd, 1985; 
Finke, Freyd & Shyi, 1986; Freyd, 1992) that mental 
extrapolations can not be halted instantly. However it is 
also possible that opposing influences could be operating. 
The tendency for subjects to displace sounds inwards was 
apparent at all locations, and this tendency would have the 
effect of negating the memory displacement effect as the sound 
moves away from the subject. 
The sound localization literature attests to the fact 
that sizes in errors and response variability are smallest for 
stimuli directly in front of subjects, with a noticeable 
increase at more peripheral locations (Makous & Middlebrooks, 
1990-cited in Middlebrooks & Green, 1991). Similarly, 
subjects have been shown to under-estimate distances when 
localizing a sound source (Handel, 1989) particularly when the 
sound is relatively close to them, since loudness differences 
seem to be the necessary cue. The inclusion of a control 
condition to assess localization ability when no movement is 
involved, is clearly needed. Unfortunately the need for 
static controls was not anticipated when the apparatus was 
built, and therefore a static localization task was not 
possible in the time available. 
The results of this study are generally as predicted. 
They provide a convincing demonstration of a motion induced 
memory displacement effect by identifying a significant 
variation in the absolute position at which subjects indicate 
a tone to vanish as a function of a change in direction. The 
identification of a memory distortion for linear auditory 
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apparent motion, also provides the catalyst for further 
research in this domain. Some ideas in this area will be 




Four experiments, aimed at the investigation of an auditory 
motion induced memory displacement effect, have been reported. 
Experiments 1 and 2, which adopted the representational 
momentum inducing techniques employed by Freyd & Finke (1984), 
failed to find any suggestion of a movement induced memory 
effect. However, two further experiments, modelled on Hubbard 
& Bharucha's (1988) apparent motion paradigm, provide strong 
evidence in favour of such a displacement. 
An explanation for the failure of the first method to 
produce the predicted results, remains inconclusive. However, 
the inducing sequences were very short, spatial separation 
between speakers was perhaps excessive, and variability of 
the sequence direction and probe pitch, greatly increased task 
difficulty. Under such circumstances it is perhaps not 
surprising to discover a null effect, since Verfaillie & 
d'Ydewalle (1991), have argued that predictability appears to 
play a major role in the memory displacement effect. Ensuring 
a perfect match between the speakers used to probe the last 
remembered position, was also a problem.The slightest 
difference in timbre can create a uniquely characteristic 
sound, thereby making that speaker more easily identifiable. 
Concerns about the comparability of speakers was of no great 
consequence in the later two studies, as subjects physically 
identified the last heard location of the tone by directing a 
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beam of light at the spot. 
A major difference between the procedures though, related 
to the control that was exercised over the loudness cues in 
the initial two experiments. Since sounds are normally heard 
to increase in loudness on approach, the equation of the 
speakers in terms of intensity level, removed a major 
azimuthal localization cue. Whereas this may have lessened the 
perceptual 
suggesting 
experience of mot ion to some degree, 
that it alone, could be responsible 
a claim 
for the 
negative results, is dubious. The movement was implied rather 
than continuous, and the localization of a sound at the 
frequency level used in these experiments, is thought to be 
based primarily on interaural temporal differences, rather 
than intensive differences. Claims proposing that it was 
simply the loudness continuum creating the memory distortions 
in Experiments 3 &4, also cannot be substantiated. The task in 
question required subjects to select a spatial location to 
identify the vanishing position of the sound. If subjects had 
extrapolated the motion along the loudness continuum, they 
would clearly be unable to respond to q task requiring a 
locational judgement. 
It is unfortunate though, that efforts to induce the 
memory effects have led away from the simple paradigm 
advocated by Freyd. By using apparent motion it could perhaps 
be asserted that subjects have experienced a sensory illusion 
of motion, rather than forming a cognitive representation of 
the movement, as is the case when separate discrete sounds are 
used. It could also be alleged that the percept ion of real 
motion could bias the results by producing auditory after-
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effects, which appear analogous to those found in vision. It 
seems that when a person is exposed to a moving source, they 
become adapted to the movement, and after the movement ceases 
there can be an apparent displacement in the direction 
opposite to that of the earlier motion (Perrott,1982). It will 
be recalled that a memory displacement effect opposite to that 
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predicted by the momentum effect, was in fact noted in the 
last two experiments reported. This negative effect was 
evidenced at the final four speakers in each sequence, with 
the extent of negative displacement displaying a tendency to 
increase with length of inducing sequence. While it is 
unlikely that a negative after-image could account for the 
full extent of the negative shift noted in this experiment, 
some degree of bias from such an influence, must still be 
considered . 
Such criticisms favour a repetition of a modified form of 
the standard implied paradigm employed in Experiments 1&2. 
Since the physical separation of the speakers (1 metre) may 
have broken down the cohesiveness of the event, the use of a 
greater number of speakers placed in closer proximity, with a 
slight decrease in the inter-stimulus interval, would be 
predicted to increase the perceptual salience of the 
situation. The response task was also seen to create 
confusion and add to the overall difficulty of the 
experimental situation. To simplify matters it may be more 
practical to use just one key which could be pressed when the 
subject detected a "match" to either a same or different 
judgement. In this way additional probe speakers could be 
incorporated into the procedure, and the percentages of either 
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"sames" or "differents" could be compared across probe sites. 
Just how people interpret auditory motion is still not 
clear. In the visual system there is a good deal of evidence 
for neural systems specialized for the detection of motion 
(e.g. Hubel & Weisel, 1962 cited in Schiffman, 1982) but as 
yet, there is no compelling evidence for motion sensitive 
systems in the auditory system. It has been suggested that the 
nervous system may measure sound source location at two 
distinct times and then interpret a change in location as 
motion ( Middlebrooks & Green, 1991). If people are capable of 
detecting auditory motion, they surely must have some sense of 
the rate or velocity of moving sources. For this reason it 
would be important to assess whether the memory shifts noted 
in the present study increase as implied velocity and 
acceleration are increased. This has been shown to be achieved 
quite simply, by altering the inter-stimulus intervals within 
the inducing sequence (cf. Finke, Freyd & Shyi, 1986). A more 
important aim though, would be to show that the induced memory 
displacement can be eliminated when the display sequence 
implies a deceleration of the sound movement to a final 
implied velocity of zero. In the context of this research, it 
is important to show that the forward memory displacements 
noted as the sound approached the subject, can be eliminated 
when the motion is presumed to have ceased. 
While the literature asserts that accurate specification 
of sound source is better in the azimuthal compared to the 
vertical plane (Gatehouse, 1982 it would nevertheless be 
interesting to investigate memory displacement effects for 
vertical auditory movement. Since the localization of sound 
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elevation is thought to rely upon spectral cues caused by the 
filtering effects of the pinna (Middlebrooks & Green .1991), 
there are no interaural temporal differences and thus no 
distinct left - right differences. For this reason, the 
assessment of the location and distance of a sound in the 
vertical plane has been referred to as "monaural 
localization". By using vertical sound motion, it will not 
only allow a comparison of directional influences, but it will 
provide the means of studying gravity effects 
(cf.Hubbard,1990). If a differential pattern of results can be 
found for sounds moving in a downward direction, compared to 
upward movement, this will provide more substantial evidence 
in favour of an abstract representational system. Such a 
prediction has already found support with the findings of 
Kelly & Freyd ( 198 7) , and Freyd, Kelly & DeKay ( 19 90) , who 
reported a velocity effect for auditory momentum. While the 
pitch of a tone is not normally considered to display 
momentum, it was suggested that there could in fact be an 
abstract connection between the two, by way of the Doppler 
Shift. 
If representation is abstract, as Rhodes (1987) has 
attempted to show, then it may well be possible to combine 
both visual and auditory movement within the same inducing 
sequence. For instance, if subjects were presented with a 
sequence combining individual flashing lights, and a short 
auditory sequence, would it be feasible to expect a motion 
induced memory displacement? 
Since auditory events in the real world overlap, the 
acoustic energy from one event may be masked or obliterated by 
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other sounds. The perceptual system must therefore decide if 
the event has truly ceased or whether the noise has masked a 
continuing event. This is usually achieved by assessing the 
context of the situation, and applying our knowledge and 
expectations to the situation. This causes the listener to 
expect one signal and not another. Research has indicated that 
if a constant frequency is presented to a listener, and a 
silent interval is included, the listener hears a distinct 
gap. However, if a louder noise is inserted in place of the 
gap, listeners report hearing a continuous tone (Handel, 
1989). It would appear that the identical tones on either side 
of the loud noise creates the expectation of a continuing 
event. By applying this knowledge to the procedures adopted in 
Experiments 3 & 4, it is argued that a "gapn in the inducing 
sound sequence, created by relaying a louder noise through 
2-3 adjacent speakers, should have no effect on the memory 
displacement effect. If such an effect is affirmed, then a 
reliable control condition could be achieved simply by 
radically altering the tone that continued after this "gapn. 
It seems clear that the perception of continuity depends upon 
the sounds on both sides of the interruption being the same. 
People cannot extrapolate the initial sound through the 
masking noise, but instead use use the sound on the other side 
to induce continuity. This being the case, it is argued that 
subjects will perceive a change in the sound as being a new 
event, and as such, no forward memory displacement effect 
should be apparent if subjects memory for the last position of 
a sound is probed shortly after the change. 
It is hoped that this thesis, in providing strong 
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evidence for the presence of a memory displacement effect in 
relation to the implied linear movement of a sound, will 
provide the foundation for continuing research in this area. 
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Experiment 1 




APPENDIX A: HANDOUT 1 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
CONSENT FORM 
This research is being undertaken to fulfil the thesis 
requirement for an M.A. degree in Psychology. It involves an 
investigation of a person's memory for the location of sounds. 
As a subject in this project you will be asked to listen to a 
sound that progressively moves from one position to another. 
At some stage during its progression the sound will stop 
abruptly. Your task will then be, to decide where the sound 
actually stopped. 
All results will be recorded against a code number and each 
subject's pattern of results will remain totally confidential. 
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary, and each 
subject will be required for 1 session only, lasting 
approximately 30-40 minutes. 
CONSENT 
SOUND LOCALIZATION STUDY 
RESEARCHER: ANNE DELWYNEN 
I agree to participate in the project described above, on the 
understanding that if at any time I wish to withdraw from the 
experiment, I may without prejudice, do so. 
I understand that all information collected by me will be used 
in the above research only, and that the identity of all 
participants will remain confidential. 
Name: 
Signature: ____________ _ Date: 
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APPENDIX A: HANDOUT 2 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
Researcher: Anne Delwynen 
Telephone: 366 7001 Ext. 7190 
Sound Location Study: Subject Instructions 
Experiment 1 
On each trial of this experiment you will hear a sequence of 
three brief sounds. 
These will be followed by a fourth sound we call a probe. 
This probe will sound slightly different to the previous three 
sounds. 
I would like you to concentrate very carefully on the 
progression of the first three sounds in each trial and to try 
to remember exactly where the third sound in the sequence 
stops. 
When you hear the probe tone sound, I would like you to decide 
as quickly as you can, if that probe is coming from exactly 
the same place as the last sound in the sequence you heard; 
or whether it is somewhere to the left or to the right of 
the place you remembered. 
On one third of the trials the probe will come from 
exactly the same place. On the remaining trials it will be 









of these judgements 
whilst others are 
are 
very 
On the bench in front of you are three keys. These are the 
keys you will use to record your decisions each time. At the 
start of each block of trials I would like you to position the 
index finger of your preferred hand lightly on the middle key. 
I want you to press the key in the middle if you think the 
probe tone came from exactly the same place as the last 
tone in the sequence. 
Press the right key if you think the probe tone is to right 
of the last tone you heard, and press the left key if you 
think the probe is actually to the left of the last tone in 
the sequence. 
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You may not find it at all easy to decide, but I want 
you ~o be as accurate as possible and also to decide 
as quickly as possible by pressing the appropriate 
key. 
During the experiment I would like you to place the goggles 
you see in front of you, over your eyes. Position yourself 
comfortably at the back of the seat and direct your gaze 
straight in front of you. 
Please 
during 
try to keep 
each block of 
your head 
trials. 
as still as possible 
On the floor next to your foot you will find a small foot 
pedal. This is to be used to start the sound sequences at the 
beginning of each block of trials. Once you press the pedal 
there is a 1 second delay before the sounds start. You will 
use this pedal only six times during the entire experiment. I 
will advise you when it is required. 
We will shortly be ready to begin the experimental session by 
having a short practice run (Demonstration Block) to allow you 
to familiarize yourself with the procedure and the equipment 
you will be using. It is important to emphasize however that 
the sounds in this demonstration will be presented much more 
slowly than they will be during the actual experimental stage. 
Feedback in regard to your performance will be provided in 
this block only. 
Following on from this short initiation block will be two 
practice blocks consisting of 36 trials in each. During these 
blocks you .will be using only two of the keys in front of you 
(i.e. Middle & Left or Middle & Right). This will provide you 
with practice at making the required discriminations using a 
simpler two-choice format, before you move on to the final 
three blocks which require the three key response. 
If you do not have any questions we will shortly be 
ready to begin. 
1. Please place the goggles over your eyes and position 
yourself in the required manner on the seat (i.e. rest 
yourself against the back of the seat and direct your 
eyes straight in front). 
2. Place the index finger of your preferred hand gently on 
top of the middle key in front of you. (After making a 
key press response on each trial please return the index 
finger to this position each time.) 
3. Remember to keep your head as still as possible during 
each block of trials. 
4. When you are ready you may press the foot·pedal to begin. 
APPENDIX A; HANDOUT 3 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
Researcher: Anne Delwynen 
Telephone: 366-7001 Ext. 7989 
Sound Localization Study; Experiment No.2 
GENERAL PROCEDURE: 
On each trial of this experiment you will be aware of a 
sound travelling along behind the black curtain in front of 
you . 
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This sound will begin at either end of the black rod which you 
see mounted in front of the curtain. The starting point will 
be predetermined at the start of each block of trials, and 
this will remain constant throughout a complete experimental 
block. You will be fully aware of the sound's starting point 
before each block of trials commence. 
Once this sound begins, it will move quite quickly towards the 
opposite end of the black rod. At some point it will abruptly 
stop. 
I would like you to concentrate very carefully on the 
progression of this sound and try and pinpoint exactly the 
position at which it stopped. 
APPARATUS: 
LASER-POINTER - This is a simple pointer which is operated by 
depressing the grey button on the top. This emits a very small 
beam of light which you will use to identify where the sound 
has stopped after each trial. 
WARNING; DO NOT POINT THIS TOWARDS YOUR EYES 
FOOT PEDAL - On the floor in front of you is a foot pedal 
which will allow you to control the onset of each trial. When 
you are ready to begin each time, you just press the pedal and 
after a 1 sec. delay the sound will begin. 
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SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS 
1. I would like you to take a seat on this specially 
positioned stool. You will notice that in front of you 
there is a small white cross (+) painted on the black 
bar. During each trial I want you to focus your eyes on 
that cross. 
Once you press the foot pedal to start each trial your 
head must not move at all, and your eyes must remain 
fixated on that cross. 
Please retain that position until the sound 
ceases, 
2. When the sound stops, I would like you to immediately 
point to the last place you heard the sound, using your 
laser pointer. To do this, just press the grey button, 
and focus the small beam of light onto the black bar at 
the required place. Please retain that position until the 
measuring instrument is in place and the result is 
recorded. 
FEEL FREE TO MOVE YOUR HEAD AND EYES ONCE 
THE SOUND STOPS. 
3. Each time when you are ready to begin a trial make sure 
that you are holding the laser pointer in your right 
hand. Next, press down on the foot pedal and focus your 
eyes and attention on the small cross in front of you. 
There will be a 1 sec. delay before the sound starts. 
Please remember to keep your head perfectly still and 
your eyes directed on the cross until the sound ceases. 
Try to direct your concentration on the exact position 
the sound stops at. It is now quite permissible for you 
to move your had and eyes to allow accurate 
identification of this spot. 
4. After you have made a response on each trial, it is most 
important to re-focus your attention directly in front 
of you. Do not be influenced by the finishing point of 
the previous trial(s) as this may adversely affect your 
judgement in the following ones. 
5. Since this task requires a high degree of attention over 
a reasonably long period, I realise it is easy to find 
oneself distracted on occasions. If you were .Il.Q..t. 
attending to a trial it is imperative that you inform me 
of this so I can delete that trial from the experiment. 
Failure to do so will seriously affect the accuracy of 
your results. 




we will be 
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ready 
The experimental session will begin with a short practice 
block of 11 trials. This will allow you to familiarize 
yourself with the procedure and the equipment you will be 
using. Any further queries you may have can be answered after 
this practice. 
Following on from this will be the actual experimental blocks, 
which consist of 33 trials in each. If possible, I would like 
you to complete two blocks of trials with the starting point 
of each block alternating between left and right. This will 
require a small adjustment to the position of your chair after 
each block. The entire session will take approximately 45 
minutes. 








Main Experimental Sequences 
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APPENDIX B· METHOD (Experiment 1 - Practice and Experimental Sequences I 
TABLE 1: Demonstration Block 
Speaker Probe Condition Key Sound 
Locations Speaker Press Direction 
-
Trial 1 2-4-6 6 Same Centre ~ 
Trial 2 6-4-2 1 Forward Right • 
Trial 3 4-2-6 6 Backward Right ~ 
Trial 4 1-2-5 6 Forward Left • 
Trial 5 4-6-2 2 Same Centre ~ 
Trial 6 4-2-1 2 Backward Left ~ 
TABLE 2: Practice Block 1 (Right Practice) 
Speaker Probe Condition Sequence Key Sound 
Locations Speaker Type Press Direction 
Experimental 1-2-4 4 Same Coherent Middle ~ 
Sequences 1-2-4 3 Backward Coherent Right ~ 
2-1-4 4 Same Incoherent Middle ~ 
2-1-4 3 Backward Incoherent Right ~ 
Distractor 6-4-2 2 Same Coherent Middle • 
Sequences 6-4-2 1 Forward Coherent Right • 
4-6-2 2 Same Incoherent Middle • 




TABLE 3: Practice Block 2 (Left 
Speaker Probe Condition 
Locations Speaker 
Experimental 1-2-4 4 Same 
Sequences 1-2-4 5 Forward 
2-1-4 4 Same 
2-1-4 5 Backward 
Distractor 6-4-2 2 Same 
Sequences 6-4-2 3 Backward 
4-6-2 2 Same 



































TABLE 4: Main Experimental Sequences 
Speaker Probe Condition Sequence 
Locations Speaker Type 
Experimental 1-2-4 3 Backward Coherent 
Sequences 1-2-4 4 Same Coherent 
1-2-4 5 Forward Coherent 
2-1-4 3 Backward Incoherent 
2-1-4 4 Same Incoherent 
2-1-4 5 Forward Incoherent 
Distractor 6-4-2 1 Forward Coherent 
Sequences 6-4-2 2 Same Coherent 
6-4-2 3 Backward Coherent 
4-6-2 1 Forward Incoherent 
4-6-2 2 Same Incoherent 

































APPENDIX C - RESULTS 
Table 1 Experiment 1 Raw Data 
Table 2 Experiment 2 Raw Data 
Tables 3 & 4 Experiment 3 Raw Data 
Tables 5 & 6 Experiment 4 Raw Data 
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APPENDIX C - RESULTS (Table 1) 
EXPERIMENT 1: Responses registered by each subject at the three 
probe locations 
BACKWARD SAME FORWARD 
PROBE PROBE PROBE 
Sequence 
SubiectNo. Tvoe BWD SAME FWD BWD SAME FWD BWD SAME FWD 
Coherent 17 1 0 4 14 0 0 17 1 
001 Incoherent 17 1 o_ 5 13 0 0 17 1 
Coherent 12 6 1 7 9 2 4 8 6 
002 Incoherent 12 5 0 5 11 2 2 7 9 
Coherent 16 2 0 0 14 4 0 7 11 
003 Incoherent 12 6 0 3 15 0 0 7 9 
Coherent 15 3 0 14 4 0 8 10 0 
004 Incoherent 11 7 0 2 '16 0 1 17 0 
Coherent 15 3 0 3 14 1 0 0 18 
005 Incoherent 13 5 0 5 9 4 0 7 18 
Coherent 9 7 2 2 14 2 4 13 1 
006 Incoherent 8 9 1 2 12 4 3 13 2 
Coherent 8 5 5 2 11 5 0 5 13 
007 Incoherent 7 4 7 6 5 7 2 3 13 
008 Coherent 14 4 0 4 9 5 1 2 15 
Incoherent 15 3 0 7 5 6 2 4 12 
009 Coherent 3 12 3 4 10 4 1 10 7 
Incoherent 5 12 1 0 15 3 2 6 10 
010 Coherent 16 2 0 6 10 2 0 11 7 
Incoherent 15 3 0 7 9 2 2 6 10 
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APPENDIX C - RESULTS (Table 2) 
EXPERIMENT 2: Responses registered by each subject at the three 
probe locations 
BACKWARD SAME FORWARD 
PROBE PROBE PROBE 
Sequence 
SubiectNo. Type BWD SAME FWD BWD SAME FWD BWD SAME FWD 
Coherent 5 12 1 0 18 0 0 10 8 
011 Incoherent 3 15 o. 0 16 2 0 7 11 
Coherent 5 11 2 1 11 6 1 8 9 
012 Incoherent 8 9 1 5 10 3 0 8 10 
Coherent 3 12 3 0 15 3 0 10 8 
013 Incoherent 2 10 6 0 15 3 0 11 7 
Coherent 11 3 4 4 5 9 7 4 7 
014 Incoherent 10 3 5 8 8 2 5 8 5 
Coherent 6 10 2 2 6 10 3 3 12 
015 Incoherent 7 7 4 1 8 9 2 7 9 
Coherent 5 7 6 1 9 8 1 6 11 
016 Incohererit 8 6 4 0 6 12 0 2 16 
Coherent 14 4 0 4 13 1 0 14 4 
017 Incoherent 6 12 0 1 15 2 0 10 8 
Coherent 4 11 3 2 5 11 3 3 12 
018 Incoherent 1 9 8 1 9 8 0 2 16 
Coherent 7 11 0 4 10 4 3 2 13 
019 Incoherent 4 14 0 1 10 7 0 5 13 
Coherent 3 8 7 4 9 6 0 7 11 
020 Incoherent 2 10 6 3 10 6 1 4 13 
APPENDIX C; RESULTS 








7 1. 40 
8 .79 
9 1. 21 
10 .84 
11 1. 66 
12 3.00 
13 2.35 
14 1. 91 
14 
Each subject's mean localization accuracy reported as a deviation from zero (true 
position). Positive numbers indicate an error in the direction of movement, while 
negative numbers show an under-estimation of true location.~ 
Condition Numbers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
.43 -.15 .19 .24 .08 -.79 -.60 -1.02 -2.27 -2.73 
3.30 2.00 1. 35 .83 -.12 -.82 -1.07 -1.66 -2.26 -2.02 
3.63 2.20 1.63 2.08 1.23 .78 1. 04 .04 -.94 -.91 
2.10 1.56 1. 25 1.06 .05 -.56 -.72 -2.11 -3.34 -3.04 
2.41 2. 65" 2.45 1.88 1.56 1. 53 1.08 .55 -.22 -.67 
2.41 2.31 1.14 .85 1.58 1.10 .78 -.16 -1.21 -1. 96 
2.43 1.23 1.00 -.41 -.31 -.80 -1. 74 -1.87 -2.47 -2.31 
.48 .54 .34 .43 --. 07 .68 .59 -1.06 -1.61 -2.79 
1.18 1. 30 .59 .43 .33 -.57 -.97 -1.74 -2.54 -2.59 
.70 .88 .71 .69 -.17 -.41 -.54 -1.09 -1.96 -.99 
1.16 .21 1.10 1. 85 1.91 .33 -.64 -1.16 -.55 -.61 
2.36 3.56 2.50 1. 86 1. 06 .53 1.93 .96 .06 -1. 52 
2.11 1.50 1.10 2.31 .85 .93 -.59 -.49 -.94 -1.64 
1. 43 .89 .78 -.11 -.29 -.16 -1.27 -2.16 -2.47 -3.14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
I 
No\e.: lo Convert 
.l \(l Co.-npo.v-ta-
Actual Speakers 
tc c.er.+i..,...e-tires, n--.._.\t,f>l'j Y-''j IO. . 
ac.·-h,0\ ~~eo.¼.e.-s_, G::i..-..ct,-\-icr"\ "'""""be,- l C... ~0- -b R-,~1-,~) WQS 'Y'a\-c\..,ed ~(\\., Cond\1'c.., l l 
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Table 4: Experiment 3. (Right to Left Tonal Progression). 
Each subject's mean localization j_udgement reported as a deviation from zero (true 
position). Positive numbers indicate an error in the direction of movement, while 
negative numbers show an under-estimation of the true position. 
Condition Numbers 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 .36 .40 1.15 1.48 1.63 1.05 .75 .58 .39 -.29 -.09 
2 1. 20 2.10 1.33 1. 69 2.16 1.83 1.33 -.67 .33 -.37 -2.04 
3 4.69 4.13 3.46 3.56 2.85 3.28 1.80 1.55 1.21 .83 .66 
4 .91 2.78 2.45 1.66 1.15 .49 -.02 -.67 1.59 -.96 -1.42 
5 .06 .48 .63 1.13 -.10 -.79 -.67 -2.01 -2.46 -3.09 -3.56 
6 -.09 .50 -.14 -1.19 -.67 -.39 -59 .63 -.84 -1.22 -2.11 
7 .76 -1.06 .90 1.23 .50 .39 0 -.47 -1.37 -1.17 -2.27 
8 .36 .16 .95 2.06 .95 2.41 3.11 1.76 .43 .46 1.13 
9 -2.29 0 .33 .95 .25 -.41 -.76 -1.07 -2.07 -2.66 -3.44 
10 -.04 1.01 1. 48 .79 1.10 -.11 -1.09 -.36 -1.61 -1.19 -1. 34 
11 .11 .31 .33 .44 .46 -.09 .75 -.74 -1.47 -1.91 -1.51 
12 2.56 2.46 2.00 1. 93 .83 .69 -.14 -.10 -.97 -.24 -.67 
13 -.89 -1.31 -1.92 -.72 -2.39 -1.87 -1.51 -2.47 -2.86 -2.47 -3.96 
14 .06 .56 1.05 .68 .71 .16 -.42 -.19 -1.02 -1.26 -2.04 
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 
Actual Speakers f...l 
f...l 
N 
Table 5: Experiment 4. (Left to Right Sound Progression). 
by each subject across all probe locations. 
Condition Numbers 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2.56 -.51 -.19 -.42 -.15 -1. 32 -.64 
2 .36 1. 23 -.97 .91 .46 .53 -.09 
3 1.63 2.31 2.30 1.83 2.26 1.50 -.02 
4 -.31 -1.04 -2.01 .06 -.25 .34 1. 21 
5 1.44 1.13 .60 .16 1.46 .26 .50 
6 1. 75 2.30 1. 25 .83 -.02 -.11 -.70 
7 .35 -.36 -1.07 -.09 -.04 .03 -1. 22 
8 3.53 3.60 3.16 3.53 2.56 1.09 .98 
9 .75 2.05 .48 2.25 1.40 1. 68 .14 
10 1.91 .46 .98 -.04 -.85 .79 -.14 
11 2.63 2.23 1.79 2.33 2.98 1.0 .73 
12 2.95 2.83 2.25 1.95 1.25 1.53 .31 
13 1. 65 2.16 1. 71 1.73 1. 71 .44 -.34 
14 2.00 2.28 1.88 .69 1.61 .19 -.37 
15 -1. 27 -.52 -1.45 -2.51 .46 1. 24 .19 
16 2.31 2.65 1. 20 1.48 1.13 .76 .68 
17 .98 .26 1. 33 1.01 .49 1.11 -.52 
18 2.63 2.83 . 2. 21 1.48 .70 -.39 -.69 
19 4.88 4.78 3.55 3.83 3.48 2.06 2.80 
20 2.28 1. 88 .58 1.01 .53 -.09 .38 
21 .40 .70 .ll -.41 .73 -.07 -.62 
22 1. 38 1.75 1. 20 1.10 .81 .43 .78 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Actual Speakers 
Mean localization judgement reported 
8 9 10 11 
-1.36 -1.02 -1.17 -1. 46 
-.85 -.92 -1.45 -1. 64 
.05 -.91 -.32 -.94 
.53 .12 .28 -.69 
-.59 -.24 -.09 -.97 
-2.26 -2.82 -3.22 -4.49 
-1. 61 -1.87 -1. 96 -2.49 
-.77 -.61 -1.09 -1.06 
-.02 -.71 -.80 -1.34 
-2.02 -2.21 -2.37 -2.59 
.28 .09 .40 -.09 
-.67 -1.42 .11 -.04 
-1.76 -1.79 -.75 -.84 
-1.20 -1. 82 -2.42 -2.27 
-.91 -1. 92 .33 -.46 
-.52 -.29 -1.12 -1. 50 
-.61 -.94 0 -.49 
-1.64 -1. 86 -2.92 -3.51 
3.0 1. 88 1.41 1. 83 
-1.39 -1.89 -1.62 -2.17 
-1.20 -2.17 -2.14 -3.56 
-.21 -.77 -.71 -.76 




Table _Q: Experiment 4. (Right to Left Tonal Progression). Mean localization judgement reported 
by each subject across all probe locations. 
Condition Numbers 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 -1.72 -.82 -.56 -.97 -.67 .46 -1.67 -.72 -1.64 .16 -.52 
2 -.89 -1.72 -1.55 -.19 -.62 -1. 52 -1.70 -1.77 -1.62 -1.06 -.34 
3 -1.19 .25 -3.14 -.44 -.51 .43 -.50 -.56 -1.49 -.76 -1.12 
4 1.16 1. 55 .85 1.30 1.26 .10 -.78 -.11 -.42 -1.12 -.36 
5 .81 .39 .81 .15 -.04 -.52 .31 -.66 -1.29 -1.49 -2.16 
6 1.46 1. 25 2.43 1. 61 .98 .60 .66 -.15 -1.02 .78 -.46 
7 1.16 1.85 1.23 1.78 .14 -.39 -.52 -.82 -.97 .25 -.20 
8 .58 1.30 -.46 1.58 1.48 1.28 .61 -.02 -1.94 -2.56 -2.04 
9 1.0 2.28 1.86 1.11 .86 .84 -.39 -.94 -2.22 -2.57 -2.89 
10 .96 .01 1.68 1. 88 .84 -.09 .13 -.47 -1.54 -.94 -1.52 
11 .91 .71 .74 .81 .90 1.01 .10 -1.07 -.57 -1.31 -1.14 
12 -1.17 -.62 .46 1.08 .76 -.05 -.69 -1.70 -1.20 -1. 24 -1. 89 
13 .70 .96 1.36 1. 33 1. 20 .40 -.11 -.05 -1. 81 -.93 -1.37 
14 1. 20 1.76 .75 -.02 .55 .33 .28 .28 -1.02 .43 -.49 
15 -.30 .70 -.55 -.24 .69 2.25 1.90 1.20 .17 .98 .86 
16 -.51 -1.09 .16 .26 -.70 .10 -.35 -.44 -1.24 -1.67 -1. 59 
17 1. 28 2.08 .83 .15 -.05 .15 .44 -.77 -.17 .93 .20 
18 2.46 2.28 2.03 1. 23 .99 .13 -.46 -.75 -1.66 -.92 -2.14 
19 1. 28 1.75 .73 -.84 .70 -.24 1. 34 -.77 -1.59 -1.49 -2.72 
20 .83 2.10 1.33 1.11 .93 .25 -.22 -.32 -.89 -.56 -1.12 
21 -.67 .50 .43 .48 -.97 .43 -1.07 -.56 -2.64 -1.39 -1. 41 
22 2.17 .41 -.59 -.61 1.48 1.03 -.07 -1.84 -2.09 1.58 .58 
21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 




TABLE 7: ANOVA Summary Table for Experiment 3 
Source of Sum of Mean Epsilon 
Variation df* Squares Square F p Correction 
Sub-iects 13 116. 518 8.963 
D 1 12.224 12.224 1.175 .2981 
Error 13 135.280 10.406 1.00 
L 10 334.760 33 .. 47 6 60.064 .000 
Error 130 72. 454 .557 .32 
DL 10 44.970 4.970 13.346 .000 
Error 130 43.806 .337 .48 
TABLE 8: ANOVA Summary Table for Experiment 4 
Source of Sum of Mean Epsilon 
Variation df* Squares Square F p Correction 
Sub-iects 21 156.584 7.456 
D 1 3.497 3.497 .753 .3954 
Error 21 97.561 4.646 1.00 
L 10 346.681 34.668 39.301 .000 
Error 210 185.245 .882 .26 
DL 10 51.177 5 .118 9.402 .000 
Error 210 114.309 .544 .44 
* Conservative degrees of freedom, being the nearest integer 
following multiplication by Epsilson Correction, were used 
to account for deviance of data from assumptions underlying 
within - subjects Analysis of Variance. 
